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Double Jeopardy:
Patents of Invention as Contracts,
Invention Disclosure as Consideration,
and Where Oil States Went Wrong
N. Scott Pierce*
Patents in England were once favors granted by the King with
the requirement that the subject matter be practiced, or worked, for
the benefit of the public. However, by the late eighteenth century
patents were viewed as contracts with the government. Concomitant
with this shift, the requirement to practice an invention was replaced
by submission of a written specification disclosing to the public how
to work the subject matter of the patent. In essence, advancement of
the public good by grant of an exclusionary right to practice an
invention at royal discretion was substituted with public disclosure
as consideration for grant of that right by contract. The contractual
nature of patents that evolved in England was adopted in the United
States shortly after its founding.
Disclosure of an invention can be offered as consideration by an
inventor because, unlike most substance of sovereign dispensation,
it is not otherwise available. Also unlike favor, disclosure of an
invention cannot be withdrawn once it has been made. The Supreme
Court in Oil States v. Greene’s Energy Group failed to acknowledge
these distinctions by improperly construing nineteenth century dicta
to conclude that patents “take from the public rights of immense
value” and by asserting more recent dicta that inter partes review
is nothing but “a second look” at an earlier administrative decision.
Dismissing the genesis and irretrievable nature of invention dis*
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closure by implying that patent rights are taken from the public
by virtue of patent grant obliterates the distinction made over two
hundred years ago that patents are not privileges subject to
sovereign volition.
The Supreme Court’s new understanding of patents causes an
overlap of Article I “legislative courts” under the purview of the
executive branch, with “constitutional courts” controlled by
Article III of the Constitution. The result is double jeopardy for
patentees and reduced certainty in the business community, both
of which are anathema to the intent behind creation of ex parte
reexamination, introduced under the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, and
extending to the several proceedings inaugurated with the America
Invents Act, such as inter partes review.
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That labour put a distinction between them and
common. That added something to them more than
nature, the common mother of all, had done, and so
they became his private right.
–John Locke1
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court held in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v.
Greene’s Energy Group, LLC that inter partes review (“inter partes
review” or “IPR”) “does not violate Article III or the Seventh
Amendment.”2 An IPR is one of five post-grant proceedings instituted under the America Invents Act (“AIA”),3 the others being
covered business methods (“CBMs”),4 post grant review (“PGR”),5
supplemental examination,6 and derivation proceedings,7 all of
which are conducted by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(“PTAB”) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (variously “USPTO,” “PTO,” or “Patent Office”). A primary motive for
enacting IPRs was a general impression that the economic benefit
of patents was being impeded by a large number of “low quality”
patents covering subject matter not deserving of protection, and that
1

JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 20 (Prometheus Books
1986) (1690).
2
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379
(2018) (“Because inter partes review does not violate Article III or the Seventh
Amendment, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.”). The Court affirmed a
judgment by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) upholding a final written
decision in an IPR by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) at the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO, PTO, or Patent Office). In that proceeding, the PTAB
determined claims 1 and 22 of U.S. Patent No. 6,179,053 (‘053 patent), owned by Oil States
Energy Services, LLC (Oil States), to be unpatentable. See Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC v.
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC, No. IPR2014-00216, 2015 Pat. App. LEXIS 5328, *1
(P.T.A.B. May 1, 2015).
3
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (2018)). In many sources, “AIA 35 U.S.C.” is
used to refer to the now-codified updated provisions, while “Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.” is used
to refer to the provisions in place prior to the AIA amendments.
4
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (AIA § 18).
5
See id. §§ 321–29.
6
See id. § 257.
7
See id. § 135.
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a relatively low-cost alternative to invalidation of patents during litigation was required.8
IPRs replaced another post-grant proceeding, inter partes reexamination, that was enacted in 1999 under the American Inventors
Protection Act9 (“AIPA”) to supplement and correct some of the
perceived injustices of an even earlier proceeding, ex parte reexamination, instituted in 1980 as part of the Bayh–Dole Act.10 Neither
ex parte nor inter partes reexamination were much used, about
14,000 ex parte petitions having been filed since 1980,11 and about
2,000 inter partes reexamination petitions having been filed between
November 29, 1999 and September 16, 2012.12 In contrast, IPRs
have been heavily relied upon, over 8,800 petitions having been
filed since 2012, and have been a highly successful tool to
invalidate existing patents, 64% of petitions being found to have
no claims patentable, and another 17% finding at least one claim
was unpatentable.13
Counsel for Oil States did not contest the constitutionality of
reexamination, asserting at oral hearing that such proceedings,
whether ex parte or inter partes, were “fundamentally examinational,” meaning that third-party participation was “fundamentally a
proceeding between the Patent and Trademark Office, between the

8

See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 909 (2015)
(“The America Invents Act was nearly a decade in the making and was preceded by a
constant drumbeat in academic journals, judicial opinions, and congressional speeches
decrying the proliferation of ‘low quality’ patents that harm innovation and impose
significant costs on consumers.”).
9
American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat.
1536 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2018)) (replaced with inter partes review
(IPR) by AIA).
10
Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Bayh–Dole) Act, Pub. L. 96-517, ch. 30, §
302, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302).
11
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data (Sept. 30, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pd
f [https://perma.cc/D4NB-XY6V].
12
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data (Sept. 30,
2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_parte_historical_stats_
roll_up.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K26-NGME].
13
Id.; see also U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PAT. TRIAL & APPEAL BOARD, Trial
Statistics IPR, PGR, CBM (Nov. 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/trial_statistics_nov_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY9S-MPX7].

2020]

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

651

government and the Patent Owner.”14 IPRs, on the other hand, were
viewed as “adjudicational.”15 This distinction was nowhere mentioned in the ultimate majority opinion. Justice Thomas, who wrote
the majority opinion, upheld IPRs as “simply a reconsideration” of
“a matter involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a public
franchise.”16 According to the Court, “Congress has permissibly
reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct that reconsideration.”17
Neither the majority opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, nor
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent distinguished the constitutionality of ex
parte reexamination from AIA post-grant examination, such as
IPRs. Perhaps there is no such distinction. If not, then the constitutionality of ex parte reexamination and AIA post-grant examination
may stand or fall together.
This Article challenges justifications employed by Justice
Thomas to hold that IPRs pass constitutional muster, including
sweeping characterization of patents as “public rights”18 and “public
franchises,”19 and that “reconsideration” of the grant of a patent is
a “simple” matter “permissibly reserved by Congress” to the PTO.20
If these assertions and underlying arguments supporting the holding
in Oil States are wrong, then any basis for concluding otherwise
in Oil States should be examined and compared with more
well-established post-grant Article I proceedings, such as reissue,
interference, and, in particular, ex parte reexamination proceedings.
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, for example, stated that “the
Court’s opinion should not be read to say that matters involving
private rights may never be adjudicated other than by Article III

14
Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy
Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16-712) [hereinafter Transcript].
15
Id. at 4, 7.
16
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373 (emphasis added).
17
Id.
18
Id. (“This Court has long held that the grant of a patent is a “‘matte[r] involving public
rights’” . . . . It has the key features to fall within this Court’s longstanding formulation of
the public rights doctrine.”) (quoting United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582–83 (1899)).
19
Id. (“This Court has recognized, and the parties do not dispute, that the decision to
grant a patent is matter involving public rights—specifically the grant of a public
franchise.”).
20
Id. (“Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has
permissibly reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct that reconsideration.”).
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courts, say, sometimes by agencies,”21 and quoted another recent
Supreme Court case, Stern v. Marshall, which stated that “[t]he
presence of ‘private rights’ does not automatically determine the
outcome of the question but requires a more ‘searching’ examination of the relevant factors.”22 Following Justice Breyer’s logic, if it
can be established that patent rights of invention are, indeed, private
rights, then “more ‘searching’” examination may well “determine
the outcome of the question” of adjudication of rights in granted
patents outside Article III courts.
Part I of this Article is an overview of the closest historical
antecedents to post-grant examination under the AIA, namely
ex parte and inter partes reexamination. Part II will summarize
the majority and dissenting opinions of Oil States, analyze the
majority’s characterization of patents as “public franchises,” and
then briefly critique the majority’s view of patent “public rights” as
embodying “public interests” in the interest of separation of powers.
Part III will briefly address Oil States’ perfunctory analysis of
the Seventh Amendment as applied to patent rights. Part IV will
distinguish “private” from “public” rights, and the authority of
so-called “legislative,” or “Article I” courts, such as the PTAB, to
adjudicate rights that are deemed only “seemingly private” under
recent Supreme Court precedent. Part V will look at the broader
implications of protecting patents as private rights.
Finally, Part VI will summarize the historical view that patents
are not just private rights, but contracts between the government and
private entities premised on legal consideration of disclosure by the
patentee. This Part will also analyze In re Baxter International,
Inc.23 and Fresenius USA, Inc. v Baxter International, Inc.24 as a
joint case study in some of the possible effects of overlapping jurisdiction between the PTAB of the Patent Office as a “legislative,” or
Article I court, under the control of the executive branch, and
“constitutional,” or “Article III” courts of the judiciary branch, and

21

Id. at 1380 (Breyer, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. (Breyer J., concurring) (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 513 (2011)
(Breyer J., dissenting)).
23
In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
24
Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
22
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makes a plea for reconsideration of the constitutionality and wisdom
of post-grant examination of patents in Article I courts.
This Article concludes that, because patents are contracts and
private property of the patentee, and because the disclosure given as
consideration by the patentee cannot be returned, the government
cannot subject patents to “reconsideration of the grant” without
inherently breaking that contract, in violation of historical applications of the Constitution’s Takings Clause.25
I. ANTECEDENTS TO INTER PARTES REVIEW—EX PARTE AND
INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION
Prior to enactment of the AIA, members of the public had
recourse to two established proceedings at the USPTO for examination of granted patents, namely ex parte reexamination and inter
partes reexamination. Ex parte reexamination was instituted in 1980
as part of the Bayh–Dole Act,26 and inter partes reexamination was
added under the AIPA in 1999.27 Inter partes reexamination was
replaced by IPR with the enactment of the AIA.28
Ex parte reexamination was (and is) available to “any person,”
including the patent owner,29 while inter partes reexamination
25
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[Nor] shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”); see also Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property:
The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 724
(2007) (“It is time to set the historical record straight and to recognize that
nineteenth-century courts applied the Takings Clause to patents, securing these intangible
property rights as constitutional private property.”).
26
Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Bayh–Dole) Act, Pub. L. 96-517, ch. 30, §
302, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2018)).
27
American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat.
1536 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19) (replaced with inter partes review (IPR) by
AIA).
28
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
29
35 U.S.C. § 302 (1988) reads as follows:
Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the
Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under
the provisions of section 301 [35 U.S.C.S. § 301]. The request must be
in writing and must be accompanied by payment of a reexamination
fee established by the Director pursuant to the provisions of section 41
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was available to any “third party requestor.”30 The threshold for
grant of a petition for ex parte or inter partes reexamination was a
“substantial new question of patentability.”31 Promoted as an inexpensive alternative to litigation that would give greater assurance to
patentees of the value of their patents, reexamination was directly
targeted to enabling the Government “to uphold its agreement with
an inventor that in exchange for disclosure of new inventions the
inventor’s rights will be protected.”32 Nevertheless, several features
of ex parte reexamination proved to be shortcomings.33 For example,
neither the petitioner nor any other member of the public was
estopped from employing prior art references from a past examination.34 Further, there was no limit to the number of times petitions
could be filed by any member of the public for ex parte reexamination (so long as a “substantial new question of patentability” could
be established), and the same argument could be successfully relied
[35 U.S.C.S. § 41]. The request must set forth the pertinency and
manner of applying cited prior art to every claim for which
reexamination is requested. Unless the requesting person is the owner
of the patent, the Director promptly will send a copy of the request to
the owner of record of the patent.
30
35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1988) (repealed 1999) (“Any third party requester at any time
may file a request for inter partes reexamination by the Office of a patent on the basis of
any prior art cited under the provisions of section 301 [35 U.S.C. § 301].”).
31
35 U.S.C. §§ 303, 312 (1988).
32
Patent Reexamination: Hearing on S.1679 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Congress, 1st Sess. (1979) (statement of Senator Birch Bayh, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) [hereinafter Patent Reexamination Hearing]. Senator Bayh stated:
This bill provides an inexpensive alternative to litigation in patent
validity cases by allowing the Patent Office to consider new data that
might have been overlooked during the initial patent examination and
determine whether or not the patent should have been issued.
***
The present weaknesses in our patent system mean that our
Government is no longer able to uphold its agreement with an inventor
that in exchange for disclosure of new inventions the inventor’s rights
will be protected.
Id. at 1–2.
33
See, e.g., Dolin, supra note 8, at 909 (“The combination of these factors [in ex parte
reexamination] gives the patent challengers the opportunity to continuously cast doubt on
legitimate patent claims and to ‘black mail’ patent holders into lower royalty rates.”).
34
Id. at 905 n.161 (“[R]eexamination is not precluded by the fact that a patent or printed
publication was previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office.”) (citing
35 U.S.C. § 303(a)).
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upon in court.35 Inter partes reexamination was introduced to avoid
abuse of reexamination by including an estoppel provision under
35 U.S.C. § 315(c).36 In both ex parte and inter partes reexamination,
however, despite surviving a validity challenge in court, a
patent could be found invalid on the same arguments during a
subsequent proceeding before the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences.37 The reverse was also true, as was the possibility that
a “substantially new question of patentability” might be found in
a “patent or printed publication . . . previously cited by or to the
[Patent] Office or considered by the Office.”38 These problems
placed patentees in double jeopardy and, for ex parte reexamination,
still do.39
In addition, while courts maintain a presumption of patent
validity that can only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence,40 there was no such presumption during ex parte or inter
partes reexamination. Instead, the standard of proof was a much
lower “preponderance of the evidence.”41 Moreover, while courts
applied a so-called “ordinary and customary meaning” standard to
claim construction under Phillips v. AWH Corp.,42 the USPTO
applied a more inclusive “broadest reasonable interpretation”
(“BRI”).43 Even on appeal, a presumption of validity would not
be observed, nor would claims be reviewed under the Phillips

35

Id. at 903–04.
35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1988) (repealed 1999) (“A third-party requestor whose request
for an inter partes re-examination results in an order under section 313 [35 U.S.C. § 313]
is estopped from asserting at a later time, in any civil action arising in whole or in part . . .
the invalidity of any claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on any ground
which the third-party requester raised or could have raised during the inter partes
reexamination proceedings.”).
37
Dolin, supra note 8, at 904 (citing In re Baxter Int’l, 678 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2012)). The BPAI was the immediate predecessor at the Patent Office to the PTAB.
38
See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2018). See id. at 902 n.144.
39
Id. Moreover, ex parte reexamination puts the PTAB, the successor to the BPAI, in
conflict with the Art. III courts, as will be discussed in Part VI, infra.
40
See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
41
Dome Patent L.P. v. Lee, 799 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
42
415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
43
See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(MPEP) § 2103 (9th ed. 2014) (last revised Jan. 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/s2103.html [https://perma.cc/TQ8Z-DPRP].
36
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“ordinary and customary meaning” standard as they would be absent
appeal from the BPAI.44
Ex parte and inter partes reexamination shared many of the
features that were viewed as shortcomings to be addressed by the
AIA.45 Nevertheless, only inter partes reexamination, which
provided for estoppel, and therefore thought to be an improvement
over ex parte reexamination,46 was repealed and substituted with
IPR; ex parte reexamination was left in place. Inter partes review
continued many problematic aspects of ex parte and inter partes
reexamination, such as high cost, delay, and a lower threshold to
demonstrate invalidity, and even added new hurdles for patentees,

44

For inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR) and covered business methods
(CBM), this standard recently has been changed at the Patent Office, whereby the standard
for claim construction is now that of Phillips. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard
for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83
Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). However, the BRI standard
remains in place for reexamination, reissue, supplemental examination, and derivation
proceedings. See, e.g., Scott McKeown, Patent Owners May Rue the Day They Pushed the
PTAB to Phillips, ROPES & GRAY: PATS. POST-GRANT (May 9, 2018),
https://www.patentspostgrant.com/patent-owners-will-rue-day-pushed-ptab-philips/
[https://perma.cc/5WXG-LKLQ].
45
See Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senate Begins Debate on Leahy–Smith
America Invents Act (Sept. 6, 2011), available at https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/
senate-begins-debate-on-leahy-smith-america-invents-act [https://perma.cc/SQ54-UVCJ]
(“The bill will also improve upon the current system for challenging the validity of a patent
at the PTO. The current inter partes reexamination process has been criticized for being too
easy to initiate and used to harass legitimate patent owners, while being too lengthy and
unwieldy to actually serve as an alternative to ligation when users are confronted with
patents of dubious validity.”).
46
See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Advantages of Inter Partes Reexamination, 90 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 579 (2008); see also Dolin, supra note 8, at 903:
[E]ven if the PTO were to confirm the patent in the reexamination
proceedings (or if it failed to even initiate such proceedings for lack of
a substantial new question of patentability under section 102 or section
103) that does not prevent the putative infringer from re-arguing the
issue or arguing any other grounds of invalidity in court.
(citing N. Thane Bauz, Reanimating U.S. Patent Reexamination: Recommendations for
Change Based Upon a Comparative Study of German Law, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 945,
954 (1994)) (“Unless the patent is invalidated or ‘substantively’ altered, there is absolutely
no binding legal effect of the reexamination. Therefore, even though a patent has been
reexamined and a certificate of reexamination has issued, the courts are free to
subsequently invalidate the patent on the basis of the same prior art that was analyzed
during the reexamination.”).
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such as a more limited opportunity to amend claims.47 Like reexamination before it, inter partes review also suffers from the problem
of “serial” petitions that allow successive challenges to patents by
third parties as a tactical measure to weaken patentees, and even
to enable those third parties to leverage disproportionately large
resources held by unrelated business “players.”48
An underlying concern with post-grant examination of any type,
not just ex parte or inter partes reexamination, but also PGR, IPR,
and CBM, all of which were borne of the AIA, is the relationship
between decisions made with respect to granted patents by the
PTAB as an executive body under Article I of the Constitution, and
the federal judiciary under Article III. Such an analysis, however,
must address the nature of granted patents in the United States and,
more particularly, assess the Supreme Court’s recent characterization in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group,
LLC of patents as “public rights—specifically, the grant of a public

47

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1) (2018):
(d)
Amendment of the Patent.
(1) In general—During an inter partes review instituted under
this chapter, the patent owner may file 1 motion to amend the
patent in 1 or more of the following ways:
(A)
Cancel any challenged patent claim.
(B)
For each challenged claim, propose a reasonable
number of substitute claims.
By way of contrast, there is no limit in ex parte reexamination to the opportunities to amend
claims and, likewise, there was no such limit in inter partes reexamination.
48
While 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) for inter partes review, and 35 U.S.C. § 325(e) for postgrant review provide for estoppel on “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably
could have raised” during each respective proceeding, several avenues for abuse, including
various embodiments of “serial petitions,” have been documented. See, e.g., Dolin, supra
note 8, at 931; see also Letter from Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Chris Coons (D-DE) of
the Committee on the Judiciary to the Honorable Andrei Iancu (Apr. 9, 2019), available at
Tiffany Hu, Iancu Urged To Reject Sens.’ Plan For Crushing Serial IPRs, LAW360 (Apr.
29, 2019), www.law360.com/ip/articles/1154316/iancu-urged-to-reject-sens-plan-forcrushing-serial-iprs?nl_pk=98e2b1d-7315-455e-88fd-78e230ab198&utm_source=
newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ip
[https://perma.cc/2PTW-RKUM]
(requesting answers to questions addressing concerns from “patent stakeholders about
abuse of the inter partes review process in the form of ‘serial’ petitions”). Additional
documentation can be found at Tillis, Coons Ask Iancu to Take Action on Serial IPR
Challenges, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/04/10/
tillis-coons-ask-iancu-take-action-serial-ipr-challenges/id=108143/
[https://perma.cc/
5UW3-4X6W].
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franchise,” whereby “[i]nter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant [that] Congress has permissibly reserved [to the]
PTO . . . .”49 Placing this holding by the Supreme Court in historical
context should provide some insight into the relative susceptibility
of patents to “reconsideration” under and among the distinct
standards affecting validity in Article I and Article III courts.
II. OIL STATES AND ARTICLE III
Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC
held that inter partes review does not violate Article III, and does
not violate the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. Part II.A
will summarize the majority opinion, including conclusions by the
Court that patents are “public franchises” and that inter partes
review falls within “public rights doctrine,” making patents subject
to reconsideration by authority reserved to the PTO by Congress.
Part II.B provides short critiques of Justice Thomas’ majority
opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, as well as the effect of
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, which factored into the
majority opinion. Part II.C analyzes historical characterization
of patents as “franchises,” and Part II.D addresses the impact of
“public interest” in patents as “public rights” on patent validity and
constitutional separation of powers.
A. Summary of the Majority Opinion—The Patent “Franchise” of
“Public Rights”
The Court in Oil States decided that a determination of patent
validity by inter partes review at the Patent Office was a violation of
neither Article III nor the Seventh Amendment.50 The Court began
49

Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373
(2018).
50
Id. at 1370 (“In this case we address whether inter partes review violates Article III or
the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. We hold that it violates neither.”). The
relevant sections of Art. III state:
ARTICLE III
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish . . . .
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by acknowledging that “[t]he America Invents Act replaced inter
partes reexamination with inter partes review,”51 and that “[t]he
primary distinction between inter partes review and the initial grant
of a patent is that inter partes review occurs after the patent has
issued.”52 Concluding that such a “distinction does not matter
here”53 and relying on its own precedent, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee54 and Crowell v. Benson,55 the majority stated that
“the PTO has ‘the authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—
a patent claim’ in an inter partes review,”56 and that “[p]atents thus
remain ‘subject to [the Board’s] authority’ to cancel outside of an
Article III court.”57
IPRs were upheld under both Article III and the Seventh Amendment on a presumed distinction between “public rights” and “private
rights,” wherein, according to Justice Thomas, “[Supreme Court]
precedents have given Congress significant latitude to assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than Article III courts.”58
He admitted that, “[t]his Court has not ‘definitively explained’ the
distinction between public and private rights”59 and that
“precedents applying the public-rights doctrine have ‘not been
entirely consistent.’”60 Nevertheless, the majority opinion held that

***
Section 2. [1] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, . . . to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party . . . .
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2. The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend VII.
51
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1371.
52
Id. at 1374.
53
Id.
54
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
55
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
56
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374 (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137).
57
Id. (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50).
58
Id. at 1373 (emphasis added).
59
Id. (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)).
60
Id. (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 488 (2011)).
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“[i]nter partes review falls squarely within the public-rights
doctrine.”61 In particular, Justice Thomas stated for the majority that
“the decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights—
specifically, the grant of a public franchise,” and that “[i]nter partes
review is simply a reconsideration of that grant,” for which
“Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct
that reconsideration.”62 Yet, despite reciting several Supreme Court
cases that referenced patents as “public franchises,” the term
“franchise” was not defined in Oil States, nor were “public rights”
distinguished from “private rights” in the context of granted patents.
The Court’s holding regarding the Seventh Amendment was
seemingly dismissed as an afterthought to “proper” adjudication. As
stated by the Court, “when Congress properly assigns a matter to
adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, ‘the Seventh Amendment
poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a
nonjury factfinder.’”63
B. Historical Precedent to Article III Consideration of Patent
Validity
Justice Thomas made sweeping characterizations regarding the
fundamental nature of patents and, in doing so, either dismissed or
misrepresented dicta from several seminal nineteenth-century cases
defining the source of patent rights and their relation to other
well-established kinds of exclusivity granted by the government.
Part II.B.1 is a short critique of the majority opinion in view
of nineteenth-century precedent. Part II.B.2 reviews Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, and Part II.B.3 assesses the effect of another recent
decision by the Court, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee,
which was relied upon by Justice Thomas in his majority opinion.
1. A Short Critique of the Majority View of
Nineteenth-Century Precedent
Drawing language from the nineteenth-century Supreme Court
decision of United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., Justice

61
62
63

Id.
Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1379 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53–54 (1989)).
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Thomas asserted that, “[b]y ‘issuing patents,’ the PTO ‘take[s] from
the public rights of immense value, and bestow[s] them upon the
patentee.’”64 However, the majority in Oil States misapplied this
language from judicial precedent in that the Court in American Bell
was not referring to a broad power of the Patent Office to rescind
granted patents. Instead, the Court’s immediate focus was more
narrow, holding only with respect to certain “patents which are here
sought to be annulled.”65 In dicta, however, the Court did not limit
its opinion to a question of entitlement “to obtain a cancellation or
vacation of an instrument obtained from [the Patent Office] by fraud
and deceit . . . ,” but, rather, broadly considered “the affirmative
relief to which the United States is entitled.”66 Nevertheless, and
contrary to Justice Thomas’s broad assertion, “absent fraud and
deceit” on the Patent Office, there is no indication that the Court in
American Bell viewed grant of a patent, in and of itself, as taking
rights from the public. For example, mistake by the Patent Office
might well include the grant of the exclusionary right of a patent
in exchange for subject matter that would not have been made available to the public but for disclosure by the patentee in consideration
of that right.67

64

Id. at 1373 (quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888)).
American Bell, 128 U.S. at 370 (“The United States, by issuing the patents which are
here sought to be annulled, has taken from the public rights of immense value, and
bestowed then upon the patentee.”) (emphasis added). It should be noted that the suit was
brought by the United States against American Bell Telephone Company alleging fraud on
the Patent Office. Id. at 353 (“The bill alleges that Bell, the patentee, knew at the time of
filing his application [at the Patent Office] that he was not the original and first
inventor . . . .”).
66
Id. at 373. As stated by the Court in American Bell:
There is nothing in these provisions expressing an intention of limiting
the power of the government of the United States of America to get rid
of a patent obtained by fraud and deceit; . . . we think the argument that
this was intended to supersede the affirmative relief to which the
United States is entitled, to obtain a cancellation or vacation of an
instrument obtained from it by fraud, an instrument which affects the
whole public, whose protection from such a fraud is eminently the duty
of the United States, is not sound.
Id.
67
See, e.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he patent right to exclude a party from practicing a particular
invention is never held by the sovereign, but only by the patentee after issuance.”).
65

662

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:645

In dicta, the Court in American Bell clearly delineated the limits
of executive authority by stating that, while “fraud in the patentee”
is not the only judicial ground upon which a patent can be invalidated by a court,68 a “patent is but evidence of a grant, and the
officer who issues it acts ministerially and not judicially.”69 To make
its point, the Court in American Bell drew a parallel with land patents, stating that, “[t]he power . . . to issue a patent for an invention,
and the authority to issue such an instrument for a grant of land,
emanate from the same source; and, although exercised by different
bureaus or officers under the government, are of the same nature,
character, and validity, and imply in each case the exercise of the
power of the government according to modes regulated by acts of
congress.”70 The Court in American Bell then quoted United
States v. Stone, which was directed to land patents, stating that “[a]
patent is the highest evidence title, and is conclusive against the government, and all claiming under junior patents or titles, until it is set
aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal,” and that “one officer
of the land-office is not competent to cancel or annul the act of his
predecessor. That is a judicial act, and requires the judgment of
a court.”71
Justice Thomas dismissed statements in American Bell, as well
as those of other precedent, such as McCormick Harvesting Machine
Co. v. Aultman,72 decided ten years after American Bell, which
limited the authority to “set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct
it for any reason, whatever,” to “the courts of the United States.”73
Both cases were distinguished by Justice Thomas as having been
“decided under the Patent Act of 1870,” which “did not include
any provision for post-issuance administrative review.”74 For

68

American Bell, 128 U.S. at 365. (“Nor is fraud in the patentee the only ground upon
which a bill [of complaint] will be sustained. Patents are sometimes issued unadvisedly or
by mistake, where the Office has no authority in law to grant them, or where another party
has a higher equity, and should have received the patent.”).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 358–59.
71
Id. at 365 (quoting United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. 525, 535 (1864)).
72
McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606 (1898).
73
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1376
(2018) (quoting McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609).
74
Id.
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Justice Thomas, “[t]hose precedents, then, are best read as a description of the statutory scheme that existed at that time. They do not
resolve Congress’s authority under the Constitution to establish a
different scheme.”75
Justice Thomas in Oil States also relied on twentieth-century
precedent, Graham v. John Deere,76 to support the argument that
IPRs are only a “second look,” in that they apply the same standards
as are applied by the Patent Office prior to grant:
The Board considers the same statutory requirements
that the PTO considered when granting the patent.
Those statutory requirements prevent the “issuance
of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain.”77
However, when viewed in context, the quotation from Graham was
only referring to a constitutional provision for patent and copyright
protection that was “written against the backdrop of the practices—
eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies—of the Crown in
granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which
had long before been enjoyed by the public.”78 The Court in Graham
stated that, under our Constitution,
[t]he Congress in the exercise of the patent power
may not overreach the restraints imposed by the
stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the
patent monopoly without regard to the innovation,
advancement or social benefit gained thereby.
Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance
of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
access to materials already available.79
75

Id.
Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
77
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374 (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 6) (citation omitted).
78
Graham, 383 U.S. at 5. The constitutional provision was Art. I, section 8, clause 8
which, as quoted by the Court, “authorizes the Congress ‘To promote the Progress of . . .
useful Arts, by securing for Limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .
Discoveries,’” and generally is understood to be the basis for the grant of patent rights.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
79
Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6 (emphasis added).
76
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In neither American Bell nor Graham v. John Deere was the
Court sanctioning, as suggested by Justice Thomas, legislative
measures that claw back statutory patent rights once granted. Rather,
the Courts in both American Bell and Graham prohibited legislation
that would confer patent rights embracing subject matter previously
in the public domain, and granted standing to the government to
challenge granted patents only in Article III courts and only in cases
of “fraud and deceit” and ministerial error.
2. Justice Gorsuch’s Dissenting View
Justice Gorsuch in his dissent to Oil States rightly pointed out
that the issues addressed in McCormick80 were independent of any
statutory provisions in force, either at the time of those cases or now,
under the AIA.81 Consistent with Justice Gorsuch’s view, the Court
in American Bell asserted that the right of the government to rescind
a patent obtained by fraud or deceit was not superseded by a statutory provision under the Patent Act of 1870, namely § 4920 of the
Revised Statutes, providing a defense to infringement.82 As stated
by the Court in American Bell:
80
McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898) (citations
omitted); see also supra text accompanying note 72. The decision by the Court in
McCormick was directed to the ability of a patentee to abandon an application for reissue
and regain the original patent from the Patent Office.
81
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1384 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The Court today replies that
McCormick sought only to interpret certain statutes then in force, not the Constitution. But
this much is hard to see.”).
82
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198–217 (July 8, 1870) (repealed 1952),
Rev. § 4920 (emphasis added):
That in any action for infringement the defendant may plead the
general issue, and having given notice in writing to the plaintiff or his
attorney, thirty days before, may prove on trial any one or more of the
following special matters —
First. That for the purpose of deceiving the public the description and
specification filed by the patentee in the patent office was made to
contain less than the whole truth relative to his invention or discovery,
or more than is necessary to produce the desired effect; or
Second. That he had surreptitiously or unjustly obtained the patent for
that which was in fact invented by another, who was using reasonable
diligence in adapting and perfecting the same; or,
Third. That it had been patented or described in some printed
publication prior to his supposed invention or discovery thereof; or,
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It is, therefore, urged that because each individual
affected by the monopoly of the patent is at liberty,
when he is sued for using it without license or
authority, to set up these defenses, the remedy which
the United States has, under the principles we have
attempted to sustain, is superseded by that fact. But
a consideration of the nature and effect of these
different modes of proceeding in regard to the patent
will show that no such purpose can be inferred from
these clauses of the act of Congress.83
To the contrary, the Court in American Bell viewed “the argument that [§ 4920] was intended to supersede affirmative relief
to which the United States is entitled . . . is not sound.”84 For Justice Gorsuch, “[a]llowing the Executive to withdraw a patent,
McCormick said, ‘would be to deprive the applicant of his property
without due process of law, and would be in fact an invasion of the
judicial branch of the government by the executive.’”85 The Court

Fourth. That he was not the original and first inventor or discovered of
any material and substantial part of the thing patented; or,
Fifth. That it had been in public use or on sale in this country for more
than two years before his application for a patent, or had been
abandoned to the public.
And in notices as to proof of previous invention, knowledge, or use of
the thing patented, the defendant shall state the names of patentees and
the dates of their patents, and when granted, and the names and
residences of the persons alleged to have invented, or to have had the
prior knowledge of the thing patented, and where and by whom it had
been used; and if any one or more of the special matters alleged shall
be found for the defendant, judgment shall be rendered for him with
costs. And the like defenses may be pleaded in any suit in equity for
relief against an alleged infringement; and proofs of the same may be
given upon like notice in the answer of the defendant, and with the like
effect.
83
United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 372 (1888).
84
Id. at 373.
85
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1384 (Gorsuch J., dissenting) (quoting McCormick, 169 U.S.
at 612). Specifically, the Court in McCormick stated:
[T]o attempt to cancel a patent upon an application for reissue when
the first patent is considered invalid by the examiner would be to
deprive the applicant of his property without due process of law, and
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in American Bell explained that “it would be a strange anomaly” for
a “government which separates the powers to be exercised by its
executive, its legislative, and its judicial branches” to conclude that
in the judiciary “there should be no remedy for such a wrong,”
namely, the “practice of a gross fraud upon the United States.”86 In
essence, the Court in American Bell was stating that the constitutionality of the government’s actions are not affected by legislation
that may be in effect at any given time.
Justice Thomas, therefore, could not logically dismiss Supreme
Court precedent regarding the constitutionality of an executive
power to thereby strike down granted patents simply on the basis
that legislation in force at the time of that precedent no longer is in
effect. The primary issue in Oil States was the constitutionality of
IPRs under Article III of the Constitution and, as stated by Justice
Gorsuch, there is no indication that the holding in McCormick was
affected by any statutory provision, but instead collectively affirmed

would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch of the government
by the executive.
***
Upon application being made for such reissue the patent office was
authorized to deal with all its claims, the originals as well as those
inserted first in the application, and might declare them to be invalid,
but such action would not affect the claims of the original patent, which
remained in full force, if the application for a reissue were rejected or
abandoned.
McCormick, 169 U.S. at 612.
86
American Bell, 128 U.S. at 357–58. The Court in American Bell put the constitutional
issue as follows:
Though, by the constitution of the United States, it is declared that ‘the
judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under
this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority,’ and ‘to controversies to
which the United States shall be a party,’ the argument asserts that the
practice of a gross fraud upon the United States, concerning matters of
immense pecuniary value, and affecting a very large part of its
population, is not a proper question of judicial cognizance. It would be
a strange anomaly in a government organized upon a system which
rigidly separates the powers to be exercised by its executive, its
legislative, and its judicial branches, and which in this emphatic
language defines the jurisdiction of the judicial department, to hold
that in that department there should be no remedy for such a wrong.
Id.
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and limited the power of the government (i.e., the Patent Office) to
rescind a granted patent of its own accord consequent to fraud and
deceit.87 The holding in McCormick was, therefore, independent of
any legislation by Congress, and made clear that the executive
branch had no power to revoke a granted patent except in limited
cases. Specifically, the Court in McCormick, relying, in part, on
American Bell, stated:
It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court
that when a patent has received the signature of the
secretary of the interior, countersigned by the commissioner of patents, and has had affixed to it the seal
of the patent office, it has passed beyond the control
and jurisdiction of that office, and is not subject to be
revoked or canceled by the president, or any other
officer of the government . . . . It has become the
property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the
same legal protection as other property.88
To establish properly that these “precedents are best read as
a description of the statutory scheme that existed at that time,”
Justice Thomas would have had to provide more than a temporal
link between the Patent Act of 1870 and the holdings by the

87
Id. at 373 (“There is nothing in these provisions expressing an intention of limiting
the power of the government of the United States to get rid of a patent obtained by fraud
and deceit . . . .”). The Court in McCormick further stated:
In Peck v. Collins, 103 U.S. 660, an application for reissue made under
the laws in force in 1866 was held to absolutely extinguish the original
patent. Subsequent to that time the law of 1870, of which Rev. St. §
4916, forms a part, was passed.
***
[T]he expression of opinion in Peck v. Collins, relied upon by the
defendants, must be considered merely a dictum, and lacking the force
of a judicial determination.
***
Our conclusion upon the whole case is that, upon the issue of the
original patent, the patent office had no power to revoke, cancel, or
annul it. It had lost jurisdiction over it, and did not regain such
jurisdiction by the application for a reissue.
169 U.S. at 610–12.
88
McCormick, 169 U.S. at 608–09 (citing U.S. v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880); Seymour
v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516 (1870)).

668

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:645

Court in cases such as American Bell and McCormick.89 This,
Justice Thomas did not do.
3. The Effect of Recent Precedent—Cuozzo Speed
Technologies, LLC v. Lee
The Court in Oil States also relied on a recent decision, Cuozzo
Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, for the proposition that “[p]atent
claims are granted subject to the qualification that the PTO has ‘the
authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent claim’ in an
inter partes review,”90 and quoted an earlier case, Crowell v.
Benson, to conclude that “[p]atents thus remain ‘subject to [the
Board’s] authority’ to cancel outside an Article III court.”91
Interestingly, the Court in Cuozzo was not referring to inter partes
review in the passage that was recited by Justice Thomas in Oil
States, but rather, to reexaminations, namely ex parte reexamination
and inter partes reexamination,92 statutory proceedings that were enacted in 1980 and 1999,93 respectively, incidentally implying a parallel with inter partes review. More to the point, however, the Court
in Cuozzo did not address the permissibility of IPRs as a whole. Rather, the issues in Cuozzo were limited to the appealability of a decision to institute inter partes review and the authority under the AIA
to decide the standard for claim construction to be applied during

89
90
91
92

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1376.
Id. at 1374 (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016)).
Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137. The Court stated:
For several decades, the Patent Office has also possessed the authority
to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent claim that it had
previously allowed. In 1980, for example, Congress enacted a statute
providing for “ex parte examination.”
***
In 1999 and 2002 Congress enacted statutes that established another,
similar procedure, known as “inter partes reexamination.”

Id.
93

See Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Bayh-Dole) Act, Pub. L. 96-517, ch.
30, § 302, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2018)); see also American
Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536 (1999)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19) (replaced with inter partes review (IPR) by the AIA).
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inter partes review.94 Other than cases dating back to the nineteenth
century with respect to reissue,95 the constitutionality of post-grant
examination of patents has never been addressed.96
Likewise, the language from Crowell was mischaracterized in
that the Court there said nothing about granted patents or a “Board.”
94
See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2136. The Court quoted the relevant portions of the AIA
when laying out the issues and respective holdings on appeal:
We consider two provisions of the [Leahy–Smith America Invents
Act]. The first says:
“No Appeal—The determination by the Director [of the Patent
Office] whether to institute an inter partes review under this
section shall be final and non-appealable.” § 314(d).
Does this provision bar a court from considering whether the Patent
Office wrongly “determin[ed] . . . to institute an inter partes review,”
ibid., when it did so on grounds not specifically mentioned in a third
party’s review request?
The second provision grants the Patent Office the authority to issue:
“regulations . . . establishing and governing inter partes review
under this chapter.” § 316(a)(4).
Does this provision authorize the Patent Office to issue a regulation
stating that the agency, in inter partes review,
“shall [construe a patent claim according to] its broadest
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent
in which it appears?” 37 CFR § 42.100(b) (2015).
We conclude that the first provision, though it may not bar
consideration of a constitutional question for example, does bar
judicial review of the kind of mine-run claims at issue here, involving
the Patent Office’s decision to institute inter partes review. We also
conclude that the second provision authorizes the Patent Office to issue
the regulation before us.
Id.
95
See, e.g., McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 612 (1898);
see also supra text accompanying note 80.
96
By way of contrast, interference proceedings, which existed even before the first
patent act, address only priority of a claimed invention and, regardless, require that one of
the parties be a patent applicant before the Patent Office. Even then only a “final judgment
adverse to a patentee from which no appeal or other review has been or can be taken or had
shall constitute cancellation of the claims involved in the patent.” Patent Act of 1952, Pub.
L. 593, § 135, 66 Stat. 792, 802 (1952). As stated by P.J. Federico in his commentary on
the 1952 Patent Act, “[t]he last sentence of the first paragraph [of Section 135] provides
that a final judgment adverse to a patentee, subject to appeal or other review provided,
constitutes cancellation of the claims involved from the patent.” P.J. Federico, Commentary
on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 198 (1993); see also
G. Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Cancellation, 23 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 377, 387–88 (2017). The author is unaware that the constitutionality of this
portion of 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) has ever been challenged.
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The complete sentence from which the Court in Oil States drew the
language quoted from Crowell had a much different meaning than
simply a reservation by the Patent Office “to cancel [patents] outside
of an Article III court.”97 Rather, the phrase “subject to [the Board’s]
authority”98 was derived from language in Crowell that, in fact, supported a position contrary to the dismissal of private rights in patents
asserted by the majority in Oil States:
As to determinations of fact, the distinction is at
once apparent between cases of private right and
those which arise between the government and
persons subject to its authority in connection with the
performance of the constitutional functions of the
executive or legislative departments.99
More specifically, the Court in Crowell was referring to a distinction
between “public” and “private” rights, and based distinction
between them on a much earlier decision by the Court regarding land
patents:
The [Supreme] Court referred to this distinction in
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Company . . . , pointing out that “there are matters,
involving public rights, which may be presented in
such form that the judicial power is capable of acting
on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring
within the cognizance of the courts of the United
States, as it may deem proper.”100
This is not a blanket assertion that patents are subject to a broad
power of cancellation by the Patent Office, as purported by the Court
in Oil States. Rather, the sentence only speaks to “public rights,”
which “arise between the government and persons subject to its

97

Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374
(2018) (“Patents thus remain ‘subject to [the Board’s] authority’ to cancel outside of an
Article III court.”) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
98
Id. at 1374.
99
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added).
100
Id. (quoting Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272,
284 (1855)) (emphasis added).
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authority.”101 The sentence says nothing about the authority of the
Patent Office, in general, or the “Board,” in particular, to cancel any
granted patent rights.
The issue in Crowell was not about patents of invention, nor
even land patents but, instead, liability for damages consequent to
injury suffered by an employee while “performing service upon the
navigable waters of the United States.”102 For the Court in Crowell,
“[t]he present case does not fall within the categories just described,
but is one of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to
another under the law as defined.”103 The larger significance of
Crowell was not any categorical exposure of granted patents to
cancellation “outside of an Article III court,” as suggested by Justice
Thomas in Oil States.104 To the contrary, the Court in Crowell
distinguished between “legislative courts” involving “public rights,”
and “constitutional courts,” which have the sole authority to decide
“private rights.”105 As recited above, the Court in Crowell understood cases of private rights to address “the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined,”106 while cases of “public
rights” were those that “arose between the government and persons
subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the
constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.”107 As we shall see, patents are private rights that are vested
upon grant of a patent and, therefore, only patent applicants, not
patentees, are properly subject to government authority “in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the
executive or legislative departments.”108
C. Patents as “Franchises”
The majority opinion in Oil States relied heavily on characterization of patents as “franchises” to link the exclusionary rights of
101

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 36.
103
Id. at 51.
104
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374
(2018).
105
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50.
106
Id. at 51.
107
Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
108
Id; see also supra text accompanying note 99.
102
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granted patents to “public rights,” thereby making them subject to
legislative discretion, such as by creating non-Article III post-grant
proceedings administered by the PTO. Part II.C.1 briefly surveys the
historical application of the term “franchise” to patents. Part II.C.2
analyzes the evolution of the term “franchise” as a function of “public interest” in the midst of antitrust concerns during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Part II.C.3 concludes that
characterization of “patents” as “franchises” became progressively
inapt with refinement of their respective meanings at the end of the
twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries.
1. Use of the Term “Franchise” to Define Patents
The Court in Oil States viewed the grant of patents to be at the
discretion of the Patent Office within, of course, the bounds of
positive law. Justice Thomas drew a parallel between congressional
reservation of authority to “revoke or amend” patents and other
so-called “franchises,” such as those that, historically, have been
employed to authorize companies to construct bridges, railroads,
and telegraph lines.109
Such a characterization might be useful if patents were wellestablished as franchises, and if franchises were well-defined, but
neither is the case. The word “franchise” is employed only sporadically by nineteenth-century writers of the major treatises on patent
law. For example, except in the context of the “privileges of the
cirque ports, the nursery of the English navy,” granted by King
John in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Collier110 and Godson111
make no mention of patents as franchises, instead variously referring
to them as “monopolies,” “privileges,” and “contracts.”112 Likewise,
109

Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1375 (“For example, Congress can grant a franchise that
permits a company to erect a toll bridge, but qualify the grant by reserving its authority to
revoke or amend the franchise . . . . The same is true for franchises that permit companies
to build railroads or telegraph lines.”) (citing Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242
U.S. 409, 421 (1917); United States v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 1, 24–25, 37–38
(1895)).
110
See generally JOHN DYER COLLIER, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW
INVENTIONS (2d ed. 1803).
111
See generally RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
INVENTIONS AND OF COPYRIGHT (1823).
112
COLLIER, supra note 110, at 26; GODSON, supra note 111, at 44.
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Phillips113 makes no mention of the word, nor do Hindmarch114 or
Curtis.115 Robinson states unequivocally that use of the term “franchise” by the Court in American Bell and in another case, Attorney
General v. Rumford Chemical Works,116 is error:
The judges, in the two cases [American Bell and
Rumford] now examined, repudiate all similarity
between a patent for an invention and a land grant,
and identify it with a franchise both in nature and
effect. This is obviously an error. The issue of a
patent does not confer a simple franchise; it creates a
monopoly. Although the government and the public
do not own the invention, they do possess rights
in reference to it of the most important character,
which are suspended or relinquished by the grant of
letters-patent . . . . If this question [of government
rights over patents] is to be determined by analogy it
is thus evident that the doctrine applied to land
grants, and not that to franchises, must furnish us
with the desired solution.117

113

See generally WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS, 1837:
INCLUDING THE REMEDIES AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO PATENT RIGHTS
(1837).
114
See generally W. M. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO PATENT
PRIVILEGES FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS (1846).
115
See generally GREG TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
USEFUL INVENTIONS (3d ed. 1867).
116
See Attorney Gen. ex rel. Hecker v. Rumford Chem. Works, 32 F. 608 (C.C. D.R.I.
1876).
117
2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 468, 473,
474 n.1 (1890) (emphasis added).
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Courts variously have distinguished and interchanged as synonymous the terms “monopoly” and “franchise” throughout American legal history.118 In Bloomer v. McQuewan,119 for example, the
Supreme Court, when distinguishing between the “grant of the right
to make and vend the machine, and the grant of the right to use it”120
in the context of patents, used “monopoly” and “franchise” as synonymous terms:
The franchise which the patent grants, consists
altogether in the right to exclude everyone from
making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all that
he obtains by the patent. And when he sells the
exclusive privilege of making or vending it for use in
a particular place, the purchaser buys a portion of the
franchise which the patent confers. He obtains a
share in the monopoly, and that monopoly is derived
from, and exercised under, the protection of the
United States.121
Howsoever characterized, the Court in Bloomer stated that the
exclusionary right expires upon sale:
But the purchaser of the implement or machine for
the purpose of using it in the ordinary pursuits of life,
stands on different ground. In using it, he exercises
no rights created by the act of Congress, nor does he
derive title to it by virtue of the franchise or exclusive
118

See, e.g., BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT
LAW 6 (1967). Bugbee stated:
Patents of invention have been variously designated privileges,
monopolies, and franchises . . . . In the nineteenth century, United
States patents of invention were sometimes called “franchises,” and
this word has also been employed more recently. With true impartiality
the Supreme Court of the United States even used “special privilege,”
“monopoly,” and “franchise” interchangeably in a patent decision of
1852.
Id. (citing Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533–34 (1870); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 258 U.S. 451, 463 (1922); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549–51
(1852)).
119
Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 539.
120
Id. at 549.
121
Id. (emphasis added).
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privilege granted to the patentee. . . . And when the
machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no
longer within the limits of the monopoly.122
There is, therefore, according to the Court in Bloomer, a distinction
between the exclusionary right to make, use, and sell under a patent
franchise, which may be apportioned, and the right to use consequent to purchase of protected subject matter, which is apart from
that exclusionary right. There is, however, no parsing of meaning
between the terms “franchise” and “monopoly” under which the
right to make, use, and sell can be apportioned.
By way of contrast, in Seymour v. Osborne,123 which was decided just eighteen years after Bloomer and cited by Justice Thomas
in Oil States,124 the Court clearly distinguished between monopolies
and franchises, relying on purported differences in the source of authority and the nature of exclusive rights. The Court in Seymour
stated:
Letters patent are not to be regarded as monopolies,
created by the executive authority at the expense and
to the prejudice of all the community except the
persons therein named as patentees, but as public
franchises granted to the inventors of new and useful
improvements for the purpose of securing to them,
as such inventors, for the limited term therein
mentioned, the exclusive right and liberty to make
and use and vend to others to be used their own
inventions, as tending to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts, and as matter of compensation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and
expense in making the inventions, and reducing the

122

Id. (emphasis added).
78 U.S. at 516.
124
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373
(2018) (“Specifically, patents are ‘public franchises’ that the Government grants ‘to the
inventors of new and useful improvements.’”) (citing Seymour, 78 U.S. at 533).
123
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same to practice for the public benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned by the laws
of Congress.125
The Court in Seymour, therefore, viewed the distinction between
“monopolies” and “public franchises” as a difference in the effect of
the exclusive right on the community, wherein monopolies operate
“at the expense and to the prejudice of all the community except the
persons therein named as patentees.”126 Public franchises, on the
other hand, functioned as “compensation to the inventors” in
exchange for reducing their inventions to practice “for the public
benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned by the
laws of Congress.”127
Nevertheless, the Court in Seymour also stated that “[i]nventions
secured by letters patent are property in the holder of the patent, and
as such are as much entitled to protection as any other property,
consisting of a franchise, during the term for which the franchise or
the exclusive right is granted.”128 All of this, however, was dicta in
that the issue in Seymour was whether a patentee was entitled to an
injunction for activities conducted during an extension of patent
term by a party that had taken a license on that patent during its
original term.129 The holding of the Court did not hinge on whether
the behavior of the patentee acted to the “prejudice of all the community” or “for the public benefit.”
In 1888, the Court in California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co.
referred to franchises as a “right of eminent domain [that] can only
be exercised by virtue of a legislative grant.”130 Examples of franchises given by the Court included “a public highway or a public
ferry or railroad,” or the right to “charge tolls for the use of the

125

Seymour, 78 U.S. at 533–34 (emphasis added).
Id. at 533.
127
Id. at 533–34.
128
Id. at 533.
129
Id. at 534, 560 (“[T]he reissued patents were fully extended for seven years from the
expiration of the original term . . . . For these reasons we are all of the opinion that the
complainants are entitled to a decree that their several patents are valid, and for an account
and for a perpetual injunction, except as to such, if any, as have expired.”).
130
California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1888).
126
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same.”131 The Court saw a franchise as a grant of exclusive use of
property already in the public domain:
No private person can establish a public highway or
a public ferry or railroad, or charge tolls for the use
of the same, without authority from the legislature,
direct or derived. These are franchises. No private
person can take another’s property, even for a public
use, without such authority; which is the same as to
say that the right of eminent domain can only be
exercised by virtue of a legislative grant. This is
a franchise.132
A patent for an invention does not fit this model. Rather, a patent for
an invention is only put into the public domain by the inventor in
exchange for a grant, or with the prospect of grant of a patent from
the government.133 In other words, inventions are not pre-existing
property of the government to which exclusive rights can be granted.
They are, instead, creations that are disclosed to the public in
exchange for (at least the prospect of) being granted an exclusive
right to make, use, and sell for a limited period of time. If franchises
are grants of exclusive rights to governmentally-held public property, then patents are not franchises.
2. Public Interest in Patent Rights—Protecting Against
Restraint of Trade
Late in the nineteenth century, rapid industrialization in the
United States prompted legislation to mitigate restraint of trade consequent to competition in large markets among relatively few players.134 Inevitably, the exclusionary rights associated with patents
became linked to efforts to regulate competition, such as the
131

Id. at 40.
Id. at 40–41 (emphasis added).
133
American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113
Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2018)) required all U.S. non-provisional
patent applications to be published eighteen months from their filing date, with a few
exceptions, regardless of whether a U.S. patent ultimately issued.
134
See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7);
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53); Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 73, 28 Stat.
570.
132
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Sherman Act of 1890, ultimately touching upon fundamental concepts underlying patent rights.135 An early example can be found in
a decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
namely National Harrow Co. v. Hench, in 1897, which stated that
“[p]atents confer a monopoly as respects the property covered by
them, but they confer no right upon the owners of several distinct
patents to combine for the purpose of restraining competition and
trade.”136 Therefore, antitrust laws would, presumably, generally
apply to manipulation of patents, at least in combination with
each other.
On the other hand, in 1907, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber
Works Co., specifically asserted that the Sherman Antitrust Act did
not implicate the monopoly of patent rights:
The Sherman law contains no reference to the patent
law. Each was passed under a separate and distinct
constitutional grant of power; each has passed
professedly to advantage the public; the necessary
implication is not that one iota was taken away from
the patent law; the necessary implication is that
patented articles, unless or until they are released by
the owner of the patent from the dominion of his
monopoly, are not articles of trade or commerce
among the several states.137
The patentee’s choice to withhold use of the subject matter of
a granted patent from the public, as viewed in Seymour,138 can be
compared with the Court’s view in Continental Paper Bag Co. v.
Eastern Paper Bag Co.139 There, unlike the Court in Seymour, the
Supreme Court seemed to endorse a monopolistic characterization
of patents:

135

See, e.g., E.S. Meyers & S.D. Lewis, The Patent “Franchise” and the Antitrust Laws,
30 GEO. L.J. 117 (1941).
136
Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Hench, 83 F. 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1897) (emphasis added).
137
See Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works, 154 F. 358, 362 (7th Cir.
1907) (emphasis added).
138
See supra text accompanying note 125.
139
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
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As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded
from the use of the new patent, we answer that such
exclusion may be said to have been of the very
essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is
the privilege of any owner of property to use or not
use it, without question of motive.140
However, like the Court in Seymour, the Court in Continental
Paper Bag also appeared equivocal about the absolute nature of
exclusivity, and even to qualify that characterization in that,
“regarding the situation of the parties in view of the public interest,
[whether] a court of equity might be justified in withholding relief
by injunction, we do not decide.”141
Something at least like “public interest” was inferred by the
Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts just one year later, in
Blount Manufacturing. Co. v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing. Co.,142
which stated that “[t]he equitable status of an owner of a patent who
has purchased and held it in nonuse for this purpose is still an open
question, and was not determined by the Paper Bag Patent Case.”143
The court, then, went on to specifically deny that the Sherman Act
was inapplicable to patentees’ exclusionary rights:
An attempt to make profit out of letters patent by
suppressing the invention covered thereby is outside
the patent grant, and is so far removed from the spirit
and intent of the patent law that the mere fact that
an inventor may make a profit by suppressing his
invention is not a sufficient reason for holding the
Sherman act inapplicable to agreements affecting
patented articles . . . . To prohibit contracts for the
suppression or restraint of his own trade by the
application of the Sherman anti-trust act is not

140

Id. at 429.
Id. at 430 (“Whether, however, as [sic] case cannot arise where, regarding the situation
of the parties in view of the public interest, a court of equity might be justified in
withholding relief by injunction, we do not decide.”) (emphasis added).
142
166 F. 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
143
Id. at 560.
141
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inconsistent with his right to manufacture, use, and
vend.144
The court ultimately held that the Sherman Act applied, at least as
to “combinations between owners of independent patents”:
Combinations between owners of independent
patents, whereby, as part of a plan to monopolize the
commercial field, competition is eliminated, are
within the Sherman act, for the reason that the
restraint of trade or monopoly arises from combination, and not from the exercise of rights granted by
letters patent. As by the terms of the contracts under
consideration the owners of distinct patents each
agreed to restrain its own interstate trade, I am of the
opinion that the contracts are in these particulars
obnoxious to the Sherman anti-trust act.145
In 1912 the Supreme Court again weighed in, in Standard
Sanitary Manufacturing. Co. v. United States, concluding that
“[r]ights conferred by patents are indeed very definite and extensive,
but they do not give any more than other rights a universal license
against positive prohibitions. The Sherman law is a limitation of
rights, rights which may be pushed to evil consequences, and therefore restrained.”146 As exemplified by application of the Sherman
Act, at least, the “public interest” identified by Continental Paper
Bag147 operated to limit the capacity of patent holders to cooperatively manipulate the market and thereby treat patents as monopolies
that operate “at the expense and to the prejudice of all the community except the persons therein named as patentees” as proscribed by
the Supreme Court in Seymour.148

144
145
146
147
148

Id.
Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912).
See supra text accompanying notes 139–141.
See supra text accompanying notes 125–129.
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3. Broadening “Public Interest” Against Patents as
“Franchises” Beyond Restraint of Trade
Just ten years after Standard Sanitary Manufacturing. Co., the
Court, in United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States,149 relied on
Bloomer to unmoor use of the term “franchise” from an exclusionary
grant of rights to property otherwise publicly owned, as suggested
by the Court in Central Pacific Railroad,150 to cover a broad statutory right of exclusivity that accompanies any granted patent,
thereby apparently cementing equivalence of the terms “franchise”
and “monopoly.”151 The Court in United Shoe stated:
From an early day it has been held by this court
that the franchise secured by a patent consists only
in the right to exclude others from making, using,
or vending the thing patented without the permission
of the patentee, Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How.
539.152
Thereafter, courts continued to characterize patents as franchises, but only sporadically so, and inconsistently relative to the
meaning of “monopoly.” For example, in Picard v. United Aircraft
Corp.,153 Circuit Judge Frank, concurring with a majority opinion
penned by Judge Hand, equated monopolies and franchises.154
More explicitly than did the majority in Blount,155 Judge Frank
invoked “public interest” to ask rhetorically about the permissibility
of nonuse:
It is surely questionable, then, whether the control of
our industrial development, so far as it is exercised
through patents, should be left solely to patentees; as
the public interest is deeply involved, it would seem
wise that representatives of the public should at least
participate in decisions of any such matters. For
149

United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 463 (1922).
See supra text accompanying note 132.
151
See supra text accompanying notes 119–122.
152
United Shoe, 258 U.S. at 463 (citing Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852)
(emphasis added)).
153
128 F.2d 632, 645 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring).
154
Id. at 645.
155
See supra text accompanying notes 143–145.
150
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patents are governmentally created monopolies. The
Supreme Court has called them ‘public franchises,’
granted by the government, acting on behalf of
the public.156
However, Circuit Judge Frank questioned any comparison of
patents, as franchises, to public utilities, over which the government
has control:
It is, accordingly, appropriate to ask whether the
holder of such a public franchise should be permitted, without any governmental control whatever, to
decide that no public use should be made of the
franchise during its life or only such public use as the
franchise-holder, in its utterly unregulated discretion,
deems wise, and at such prices as it sees fit to exact.
We accord no such powers to the holder of a public
franchise to run a bus line or to sell electric power.157
He appears to answer this question in the affirmative, using the
example of compulsory licensing to suggest that government interference would likely slow investment in new technology:
Accordingly, the suggestion—recently endorsed in
an editorial in so conservative a newspaper as the
New York Times—that all patentees be required to
grant licenses to others on reasonable terms might,
unless qualified, seriously retard industrial progress:
A provision for universal compulsory licenses may
do no harm—perhaps it will do much good—to
inventors, but may tend to frighten off extensive
investment in new patents which will induce competition with the giant industrials.158
Much later, in 1991, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Borre v. United States,159 invoked California v. Central

156

Picard, 128 F. 2d at 645 (Frank, J., concurring) (citing Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S.
516, 533 (1870) (emphasis added)).
157
Id.
158
Id. at 643.
159
940 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1991).
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Pacific Railroad Co.160 to distinguish franchises as rights “previously held exclusively by sovereign,” such as a “[cable television]
franchise,” which constitutes “a delegation of a governmental
function to private entities to be performed in the furtherance of the
public welfare . . . .”161 However, in 1998 the Supreme Court in
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.162 returned to a broader definition
that embraced patents, blending and confusing use of the terms
“franchise” and “monopoly.” The Court stated that, “the patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the
creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in
technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period
of time.”163 But, then, immediately after having stated that patents
were “monopolies,” the Court in Pfaff quoted Seymour v. Osborne
to the opposite effect: “Letters patent are not to be regarded as
monopolies . . . but as public franchises granted to the inventors of
new and useful improvements . . . .”164
In 2000, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,165
also in reliance on California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co.,166
referred to a franchise as a “transfer of extant rights previously held
exclusively by the sovereign.”167 The Court referenced Borre168
to cite examples such as “cable television and public utilities.”169
Expanding on these precedents, the court asserted that a patent,
instead, is a right “to exclude a party from practicing a particular

160

Id. at 220 (“[F]ranchise involves transfer of rights previously held by the sovereign.”)
(citing California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 40 (1888)).
161
Id. (citing 1 D. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAW § 13.13, at §
13-68.11 (1990)).
162
525 U.S. 55 (1998).
163
Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
164
Id. (quoting Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870)).
165
204 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also supra text accompanying note 66.
166
See supra text accompanying notes 130–132.
167
Semiconductor, 204 F.3d at 1380 (citing California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S.
1, 40 (1888)).
168
See supra text accompanying notes 159–161.
169
Semiconductor, 204 F.3d at 1380 (citing Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 220
(7th Cir. 1991)).
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invention [that] is never held by the sovereign, but only by the
patentee after issuance.”170
Therefore, while patents have been referred to as “franchises” in
the past, use of this term has never been consistent. More generally,
the meaning of “franchise,” other than as a right to control certain
commercial activities previously held by the government, is so
broad as to render this term essentially useless as judicial precedent
for any purpose. This is especially so when applied to the scope and
character of granted patent rights, at least as they are to be understood in the context of separation of powers under Articles I, II, and
III of the Constitution.
D. Patent Validity and Separation of Powers Under Article III
The nature of “public rights,” as admitted by Justice Thomas,
has never been “definitively explained.”171 Unlike “franchise,” the
meaning of which remained diffuse, use of the term “public rights”
became increasingly fractious during the twentieth century. Part
II.D.1 will look at the applicability of precedent relied upon by Justice Thomas to characterize patent rights, and Part II.D.2 will analyze that precedent in the context of public and private interests, and
the consequent implications for constitutional separation of powers.
1. Patents as “Public Rights”
The argument in Oil States that patents are “public rights” relied
on the late-nineteenth century decision of United States v. Duell.172
Justice Thomas stated that “[t]his Court has long recognized that
the grant of a patent is ‘a matte[r] involving public rights,’”173 and
summarized the granting of a patent as having “the key features to
fall within this Court’s longstanding formulation of the public-rights
doctrine.”174
The Court in Duell held that Congress had the “power to
authorize the Court of Appeals to review the action of the
170

Id.
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373
(2018) (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)).
172
172 U.S. 576 (1899).
173
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373 (quoting Duell, 172 U.S. at 582–83 (1899)).
174
Id.
171
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Commissioner [of the Patent Office] in an interference case . . . ”175
The “public rights” at issue were those of the government in the
course of granting a patent and, more specifically, the authority of
the judiciary to compel the commissioner of the Patent Office to
grant a patent to an applicant following an adverse decision in an
interference proceeding conducted before the Patent Office.176
Interfering claims, according to the statute in effect at the time
of Duell (and for patent applications filed before enactment of
the AIA), were treated differently depending upon whether the
interference involved a patent application or only the claims of
granted patents. Contests between interfering patents would be
heard by courts in equity, whereas only applications that had first
been refused in an adverse decision by a board of examiners would
be entitled to such treatment under the Act.177 This suggests that
legislation addressing the validity of the claims of an issued patent
was distinct from that addressing claims of a patent application for
which a patent had not yet been granted. “Public rights,” therefore,
under Duell, and contrary to Justice Thomas’ understanding of
Duell, were limited to rights associated with patent applications that
were not implicated in granted patents.178
2. “Public Interest” and Separation of Powers Under the
Constitution
The decision in Duell turned on the innate nature of the judiciary
to rule on executive actions affecting private interests. More
specifically, the issue was whether courts had the power to compel
compliance by a commissioner of the Patent Office who was

175

Duell, 172 U.S. at 582.
Id. at 586–87.
177
The Court in Duell was acting under Sections 4915 and 4918 of the Revised Statutes,
which continued Section 16 of the Act of 1836, wherein, as stated by the Court, “a remedy
by bill in equity . . . was given as between interfering patents, or whenever an application
had been refused on an adverse decision of a board of examiners.” Id. at 584. As stated in
35 U.S.C. § 135(a), which was repealed by the AIA: “Whenever an application is made
for a patent which, in the opinion of the Director, would interfere with any pending
applications, or with any unexamined patent, an interference may be declared . . . .”
(emphasis added).
178
See also supra text accompanying note 96 for statutory revisions under the Patent Act
of 1952.
176
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refusing to grant a patent in defiance of the lower court. As stated
by the Court:
Now in deciding whether a patent shall issue or not,
the commissioner acts on evidence, finds the facts,
applies the law, and decides questions affecting
not only public but private interests; and so as to
reissue or extension, or on interference between
contesting claimants; and in all this he exercises
judicial functions.179
It was, therefore, the private interest in granted patents that dictated
the character of actions taken by the commissioner as judicial, and
“judicial functions” by the commissioner were necessarily appealable to the judiciary. The Court in Duell stated:
By the act of February 9, 1893, the determination of
appeals from the commissioner of patents, which
was formerly vested in the general term of the
supreme court of the District, was vested in the court
of appeals; and, in addition, it was provided that ‘any
party aggrieved by a decision of the commissioner
of patents in any interference case may appeal
therefrom to said court of appeals.’180
The Court relied on Butterworth v. United States,181 an earlier case,
which recognized that “in every grant of the limited monopoly [of a
patent] two interests are involved: that of the public, who are the
grantors, and that of the patentee.”182 Nevertheless, the Court repeatedly stressed the “judicial character” of patent rights, requiring
compliance with a decision by the courts over a contrary decision
by an executive officer:

179

Duell, 172 U.S. at 586 (emphasis added).
Id. at 585.
181
112 U.S. 50 (1884).
182
Duell, 172 U.S. at 586 (quoting Butterworth, 112 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added)).
Justice Thomas quoted this language as follows: “As this Court has long recognized, the
grant of a patent is a matter between ‘the public, who are the grantors, and . . . the
patentee.’” Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1373 (2018) (quoting Duell, 172 U.S. at 586).
180
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This court held [in Butterworth] that while the
commissioner of patents was an executive officer,
and subject in administrative or executive matters
to the supervision of the head of the department, yet
his action in deciding patent cases was essentially
judicial in its nature and not subject to review by the
executive head, an appeal to the courts having been
provided for.183
The underlying rationale for affirming the lower court mandate that
the commissioner grant the patent was of “vital importance” in the
constitutional separation of powers:
We agree that it is of vital importance that the line
of demarkation [sic] between the three great departments of government should be observed, and that
each should be limited to the exercise of its appropriate powers, but in the matter of this appeal we
find no such encroachment of one department on the
domain of another as to justify us in holding the act
in question unconstitutional.184
Vesting determination of appeals from the commissioner of
patents in the court of appeals, rather than the head of the executive
department to which the commissioner of patents reported, was not
unconstitutional. To the contrary, given the judicial nature of the
commissioner’s actions, to hold otherwise would, in fact, blur the
“line of demarkation [sic] between the three great departments of
government” that is of such “vital importance.”185 The Court in
Duell, therefore, did not entitle Justice Thomas in Oil States to the
proposition that “the grant of a patent ‘is a matte[r] involving public
rights’”186 if that proposition is to extend to jurisdiction by the
Patent Office over granted patents by virtue of any presumed extant
public rights following grant.

183
184
185
186

Duell, 172 U.S. at 587 (emphasis added).
Id. at 589.
Id.
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373.
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III. OIL STATES AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
Oil States Energy Services, LLC argued in its brief to the
Supreme Court that, based on the Constitution’s adoption of English
common law “‘preserv[ing] the right to jury trial as it existed [in
suits at common law in England] in 1791’” and historical precedent,
determinations of fact are to be tried before a jury “in actions
customarily tried to juries in the late 18th century.”187 However,
the Court took a different view, concluding that “when Congress
properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III
tribunal, ‘the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the
adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.’”188 Of course,
this view begs the question of whether a jury would be required as a
factfinder if assignment of a matter to a non-Article III tribunal by
Congress was improper, as this Article proposes.
Despite the ambiguous history of a right to jury trial, it is
clear that while determinations of patent validity were considered
pursuant to a writ of scire facias in the Kings Privy Council, by 1789
such actions were being heard in the Court of Chancery, which had
no provision for a jury.189 However, it would be error to conclude
that, therefore, patent validity, as a matter of scire facias, was
an issue of equity rather than common law, and not subject to jury
trial. Instead, as indicated by Lemley, for example, “[s]cire facias
actions seem to have been part of the chancery court’s subsidiary
common-law jurisdiction.”190 Further, Chancery Court “might seek
the advice of a jury in assessing the facts underlying a scire facias
petition” by having the “Lord Chancellor deliver the record to the
King’s Bench for a jury trial and return the verdict to the Chancellor

187

Brief for Petitioner at 78, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp.,
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16–712), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3047, at *78
(quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974)). The petitioner, Oil States, concluded
that: “No less than wrongfully usurping the role guaranteed to federal courts by Article III,
inter partes review also usurps the role guaranteed to juries under the Seventh
Amendment.” Id. at 77.
188
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379 (quoting Granfinanciera, SA. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,
53–54 (1989) (emphasis added)).
189
See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV
1673, 1684 (2013).
190
Id. at n.44 (citations omitted).
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for consideration and judgment.”191 Consequently, even though the
Supreme Court has now held that issued patents are “public rights,”
there is substantial support for also holding that there was a common
law tradition by 1789 in England of judging patent validity by jury
trial to be continued under the Seventh Amendment, at least as to
issues of fact.
IV. THE ROOTS AND DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICA’S ARTICLE III
JURISPRUDENCE
American origins of the distinction between “private” and
“public” rights must be identified before more recent jurisprudence
that muddies those concepts can be understood, particularly if those
concepts are to be applied to modern administrative proceedings,
such as post-grant examination of granted patents before the Patent
Office. Part IV.A introduces the origins of the “private” and “public” rights in the United States, while Part IV.B walks through more
recent Supreme Court decisions broadening the scope of jurisdiction
of private rights to areas that are “seemingly private.”
A. American Roots of “Private” vs. “Public” Rights
Article III of the Constitution states that “the judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish,” and that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States . . . ; [and] to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party . . . .”192 Further, well-established jurisprudence
dictates that the government cannot be sued without its consent:
The constitution itself declares that the judicial
power shall extend to all cases to which the United
States shall be a party; and that this means mainly
where it is a party plaintiff [it] is a necessary result

191
192

Id. at 1685.
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
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of the well-established proposition that it cannot be
sued in any court without its consent.193
The Constitution also provides that the government can set up
tribunals for adjudication of rights outside Article III. The tribunals
are a form of court under Article I of the Constitution, which states
at Section 8, “The Congress shall have Power . . . [9] to constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; . . . .”194 Such tribunals are
deemed “extra-judicial,” and the reach of such tribunals can hinge
on the rights at issue as “public rights,” as opposed to “private
rights,” as first articulated by the Supreme Court in Murray’s Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.:
Though, generally, both public and private wrongs
are redressed through judicial action, there are
more summary extra-judicial remedies for both. An
instance of extra-judicial redress of a private wrong
is the recapture of goods by their lawful owner; of a
public wrong, by a private person, is the abatement
of a public nuisance . . . .
***
To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject,
we think it proper to state that we do not consider
congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or
admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under
the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is
not a subject for judicial determination. At the same
time there are matters, involving public rights, which
may be presented in such form that the judicial
power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible of judicial determination, but which
congress may or may not bring within the cognizance

193

United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279 (1888); see also McElrath v.
United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880) (“The government cannot be sued, except with its
own consent.”).
194
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
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of the courts of the United States, as it may
deem proper.195
The Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson relied on the distinction
between “public” and “private rights” in Murray’s Lessee to parse
the proper roles of respective “legislative” and “constitutional”
courts, at least “as to determinations of fact”:
As to determinations of fact, the distinction is at once
apparent between cases of private right and those
between the government and persons subject to its
authority in connection with the performance of
the constitutional functions of the executive or
legislative departments [i.e., “public rights”].
The Court referred to this distinction in Murray’s
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Company . . . . Thus the Congress, in enacting the powers
confided to it, may establish “legislative” courts (as
distinguished from “constitutional courts in which
the judicial power conferred by the Constitution can
be deposited”) . . . to serve as special tribunals “to
examine and determine various matters, arising
between the government and others, which from their
nature do not require judicial determination yet are
susceptible of it.”196
The Court in Ex parte Bakelite clearly stated the limits of
authority for each of “constitutional courts” and “legislative courts”:
But there is a difference between the two classes of
courts. Those established under the specific power
given in section 2 of [A]rticle 3 are called constitutional courts. They share in the exercise of the
judicial power defined in that section, [which] can be
invested in no other jurisdiction . . . . On the other
hand, those created by Congress in the exertion of

195

Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 283–84
(1855) (emphasis added).
196
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932) (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26
U.S. 511 (1828); Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929) (emphasis added)).
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other powers are called legislative courts. Their functions always are directed to the execution of one or
more of such powers, and are prescribed by Congress
independently of section 2 of [A]rticle 3 . . . .197
“Legislative courts” could also function in an “adjunct” capacity
under Article III courts, as stated by the Supreme Court in Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission:
In cases which do involve only “private rights,” this
Court has accepted fact-finding by an administrative
agency, without intervention by a jury, only as an adjunct to an Art. III court, analogizing the agency to
a jury or a special master and permitting it in admiralty cases to perform the function of the special master.198
In a plurality decision, and with reference to Crowell, the
Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co. stated that “this Court has sustained the use of adjunct
factfinders even in the adjudication of constitutional rights,” but that
the “functions of the adjunct must be limited in such a way that ‘the
essential attributes’ of judicial power are retained in the Art. III
court.”199 Among the “essential attributes” of judicial power that
cannot be conferred upon an “adjunct” Article I court, according to
the Court in Northern Pipeline, was issuance of “final judgments,
which are binding and enforceable even in the absence of appeal.”200
Rather, any decision by an “adjunct court” could be offered only in
an advisory capacity, and was subject to de novo review.201
Overall, the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline identified three
forums where “Art. III does not bar the creation of legislative
courts” under Article I. They are: “territorial courts,” which are
197

Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added).
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442,
450 n.7 (1977) (emphasis added).
199
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78–81 (1982) (citing
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51, 54).
200
Id. at 85–86.
201
See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S 833, 853 (1986)
(“The legal rulings of the CFTC [Commodity Futures Trading Commission], like the legal
determinations of the agency in Crowell, are subject to de novo review.”).
198
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“‘created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists
in the government’”; “courts-martial”; and “public rights.”202 While
acknowledging that “the distinction between public rights and
private rights has not been definitively explained by our precedents,” the Court in Northern Pipeline found that “it suffices to
observe that a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise
‘between the government and others.’”203
B. Expanding the Authority of Article I Courts to Adjudicate
“Seemingly” Private Rights
The Supreme Court broadened the permissible scope of legislative courts in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
Co.204 There, the Court could not agree to the appellee’s assertion
that the Courts in Northern Pipeline and Crowell established that
“the right to an Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal
Government is a party of record.”205 Rather, Justice O’Connor, for
the majority, held that “Congress, acting for a valid legislative
purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may
create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated into a
public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency
resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”206
A year later, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor, the majority opinion, also written by Justice O’Connor,
stated that, moreover, consent by the government or any other
party was not dispositive of the boundaries between government
branches:
To the extent that this structural principle [of checks
and balances among federal branches of the government] is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot
by consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the
202

Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64–67, 70 (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S.
511, 546 (1828)).
203
Id. at 69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
204
See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
205
Id. at 586 (“Insofar as appellees interpret that case [Northern Pipeline] and Crowell
as establishing that the right to an Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal
Government is a party of record, we cannot agree.”).
206
Id. at 593–94 (emphasis added).
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same reason that the parties by consent cannot confer
on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond
the limitations imposed by Article III, § 2. When
these Article III limitations are at issue, notions of
consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because
the limitations serve institutional interests that the
parties cannot be expected to protect.207
Instead, Justice O’Connor laid out four factors to be considered in
deciding constitutionally permissible limitations on Article III jurisprudence:
[1] [T]he extent to which the “essential attributes of
judicial power” are reserved to Article III courts,
and, conversely, [2] the extent to which the nonArticle III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction
and powers normally vested only in Article III
courts, [3] the origins and importance of the right
to be adjudicated, and [4] the concerns that drove
Congress to depart from the requirements of
Article III.208
None of the factors were “deemed determinative, [but, rather,
were viewed] with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the
federal judiciary.”209
Combination of these factors with denial that the government
must be a party of record in any Article I proceeding has led to controversy. For example, in the Supreme Court case of Granfinanciera
S.A. v. Nordberg, Justice Brennan for the majority relied on Thomas
to conclude that “the Federal Government need not be a party for a
case to revolve around ‘public rights.’”210 Justice Scalia, concurring
in part and concurring in judgment, however, was emphatic that
“[t]he notion that the power to adjudicate a legal controversy

207

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986).
Id. at 851 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
81 (1982) (emphasis added)).
209
Id.
210
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989) (quoting Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985)).
208
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between two private parties may be assigned to a non-Article III, yet
federal, tribunal is entirely inconsistent with the origins of public
rights doctrine.”211 According to Justice Scalia, the Court in Thomas
improperly broadened the “public rights doctrine” announced in
Murray’s Lessee beyond “rights of the public—that is, rights
pertaining to claims brought by or against the United States.”212 For
Justice Scalia, “[w]aiver of sovereign immunity can only be implicated, of course, in suits where the Government is a party.”213
“Public rights,” as a waiver of the general rule of government
immunity, was replaced by the Court in Thomas, in Justice Scalia’s
view, “by sheer force of our office,”214 with “‘simply a pragmatic
understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method
of resolving matters that “could be conclusively determined by the
Executive and Legislative Branches,” the danger of encroaching on
the judicial powers is reduced.’”215 As a result, according to
Justice Scalia, the Court in Thomas held “for the first time, that
a purely private federally created action did not require Article III
courts.”216 This was, for Justice Scalia, “too much.”217 Justice
Scalia stated:
I do not think one can preserve a system of separation
of powers on the basis of such intuitive judgments
regarding “practical effects,” . . . . This central
feature [of separation of powers] of the Constitution
must be anchored in rules, not set adrift in some
multifactored “balancing test”–and especially not in
a test that contains as its last and most revealing

211

Id. at 66 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Id. at 68.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 69.
215
Id. (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. at 589) (quoting
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982)).
216
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 69 (emphasis added).
217
Id. at 69–70 (explaining that in Thomas, “‘[p]ragmatic understanding’ was all that
counted,” but stating that “in a case-by-case evaluation of whether the danger of
‘encroaching’ on the ‘judicial powers’ (a phrase now drained of constant content) [this] is
too much.”).
212
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factor “the concerns that drove Congress to depart
from the requirements of Article III.”218
Nevertheless, since that time the number of “factors” have
accumulated, further aggravating the difficulty of administering
Justice O’Connor’s “balancing test.”219 For example, the Court in
Stern v. Marshall relied on a variety of factors to conclude that the
plaintiff’s “claimed right to relief does not flow from a federal
statutory scheme, as in Thomas or Atlas Roofing.”220 The Court held
that the Bankruptcy Court, under the Bankruptcy Court Act of 1984,
“lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a
state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling
on a creditor’s proof of claim.”221 The Court cautioned, however,
that “[g]iven the extent to which this case is so markedly distinct
from the agency cases discussing the public rights exception in the
context of such a regime, . . . we do not in this opinion express any
view on how the doctrine might apply in that different context.”222
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia counted “at least seven different
reasons given in the Court’s opinion for concluding that an
Article III judge was required to adjudicate this lawsuit . . . .”223
Justice Scalia stated that “[t]he multifactors relied upon today seem
to have entered our jurisprudence almost randomly,” and concluded
that, “in my view an Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless there is a firmly established historical practice to
the contrary.”224
On the basis of this jurisprudence, and the confusing effect of
having to consider multiple factors in a “balancing test” to assess the
necessity of the government being a party to a contest over “public
rights,” the better view may be to assume that, if the government is
not a party to a lawsuit, then the right at issue is inherently private
and that, therefore, adjudication, but for findings of fact by an

218

Id. at 70 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S 833, 851
(1986) (emphasis added)).
219
Id. (referring to Justice O’Connor’s four factors cited in Schor).
220
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 493 (2011).
221
Id. at 503.
222
Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
223
Id. at 504 (Scalia, J., concurring).
224
Id. at 504–05.
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adjunct court, should be limited to “constitutional” courts
established under Article III.
One example is post-grant examination of patents, such as by
IPR. As discussed in Section III above, there is ample basis for
concluding that, but for the conclusion in Oil States that patents are
“public rights,” determinations of fact respecting patent validity
might be subject to Seventh Amendment protection. Arguably,
IPRs, and other forms of post-grant patent examination instituted
by third parties,` are not “public rights” because they are disputes
between private parties, namely, between the patent owner and a
private third party who is not the government. Then, consistent with
the practice of Chancery Court at the time the U.S. Constitution was
adopted, a trial court could “seek the advice of a jury in assessing
the facts” underlying a question of patent validity. Even so, as
asserted in Atlas Roofing, an administrative agency, such as the
Patent Office, can be employed for “fact finding . . . , without intervention by a jury, [but] only as an adjunct to an Art. III court.”225
An Article I tribunal, such as the PTAB of the Patent Office,
under this view, should only be able to operate as an adjunct to a
district court, and then only in an advisory capacity as to issues
of fact.
V. ARTICLE III JURISPRUDENCE AS APPLIED TO PATENTS OF
INVENTION
Just as the distinction between private and public rights has
evolved with the growth and development of American administrative law, so too have popular notions of the reach of administrative
bodies over those rights, along with the introduction of new tools,
such as reexamination proceedings in 1980 and now IPRs, PGRs,
and CBMs with enactment of the AIA. Article I jurisdiction over
“seemingly private rights,” combined with the unresolved nature of
patent rights, has pitted ideas about public and private interests in
patents against each other. Part V.A reviews historical limits on the
government’s ability to invalidate issued patents. Part V.B attempts
225

Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442,
450 n.7 (1977); see also supra text accompanying note 198.
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to identify the competing interests in patents that have led to confusion over the legitimate roles of “legislative” and “constitutional”
courts, and Part V.C proposes a solution to the dilemma posed by
perceived conflicting goals of patent protection.
A. Historical Limits on the Government’s Ability to Invalidate
Issued Patents
As suggested by Justice Gorsuch in Oil States,226 Justice
Thomas’ dismissal of the bulk of nineteenth century jurisprudence
regarding patents as private rights was fatal to his argument that
IPRs do not violate due process of law under the Constitution.227 To
reiterate, and expand on the above summary of Justice Gorsuch’s
dissenting opinion, there is, in fact, well-established historical
precedent that clearly precludes the government from being a party
to a determination of patent validity. As discussed above,228 in
McCormick Harvesting Machinery Co. v. Aultman, decided in 1898,
the Supreme Court stated that, upon issuance, a patent has “become
the property of the patentee,” and, therefore, an attempt to cancel an
issued patent by an examiner “would be to deprive the applicant
of his property without due process of law, and would be in fact
an invasion of the judicial branch of the government by the executive.”229 While the court in McCormick upheld statutory provisions
for reissue proceedings,230 it was because such proceedings required
that the patentee voluntarily surrender the patent. As stated by
the Court:
If the patentee abandoned his application for reissue,
he is entitled to a return of his original patent
precisely as it stood when such application was
made, and the patent office has no greater authority

226

See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
228
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
229
McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609, 612 (1898).
230
“Reissue” is a proceeding before the Patent Office that was originally established
under the Patent Act of 1832, and is intended to correct patents that are considered wholly
or partly invalid. In the Patent Act of 1870, reissue required surrender of the original patent
to take effect. 4A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 15.02[5] (2019).
227
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to mutilate it by rejecting any of its claims than it has
to cancel the entire patent.231
A year later, in 1899, the Court in United States v. Duell,232
as discussed above, held that determination of validity of claimed
subject matter prior to grant of an issued patent was a matter of
“public rights,” thereby entitling the legislative branch to remove, at
its discretion, what would otherwise be subject to Article III
review.233 This is consistent with McCormick and decisions by the
Supreme Court that limited such public rights to patent applications.
Moreover, treatment of letters patents generally—namely land
patents and patents for invention—in the United States did not necessarily follow from practice in England. For example, the Court in
United States v. American Bell234 expressly dismissed reliance on
scire facias235 proceedings, whereby letters patent could be invalidated at the prerogative of the King236:
We have no king in this country; we have here no
prerogative of the crown; and letters patent, whether
for inventions or for grants of land, issue not from the
president but from the United States. The president
has no prerogative in the matter . . . . The patent,
then, . . . is not subject to be repealed or revoked by
the president, the secretary of the interior, or the
commissioner of patents, when once issued.237
The reason for distinguishing between pre- and post-grant was
stated broadly as a “rule” in Michigan Lumber v. Rust238: “[W]herever the granting act specifically provides for the issue of a patent,
then the rule is that the legal title remains in the government until

231

McCormick, 169 U.S. at 610.
See United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576 (1899).
233
Id. at 583; see also supra notes 172–178 and accompanying text.
234
United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
235
Latin for “make known.” See Scire Facias, DICTIONARY, https://www.dictionary.com/
browse/scire-facias [https://perma.cc/WKM9-ZVXK].
236
See HELEN GUBBY, DEVELOPING A LEGAL PARADIGM FOR PATENTS 20 (2012) (“If a
patent were to be declared void officially, it had to be annulled by the crown on a writ of
scire facias.”).
237
American Bell, 128 U.S. at 362–63.
238
168 U.S. 589 (1897).
232
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the issue of the patent.”239 The policy behind the rule, at least with
respect to land patents, was made clear twenty years earlier, in
Moore v. Robbins240:
‘A patent,’ says the court in United States v. Stone,
‘is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive
against the government and all claiming under junior
patents or titles, until it is set aside or annulled
by some judicial tribunal. In England, this was
originally done by scire facias; but a bill in chancery
is found a more convenient remedy.’
***
But in all this [in the United States] there is no place
for the further control of the Executive Department
over the title . . . . He [the President] is absolutely
without authority. If this were not so, the titles
derived from the United States, instead of being the
safe and assured evidence of ownership which they
are generally supposed to be, would be always subject to the fluctuating, and in many cases unreliable,
action of the land-office.
***
The existence of any such power in the Land
Department is utterly inconsistent with the universal
principle on which the right of private property is
founded.241
Arguably, the same reasoning can be applied to patents of invention and the Patent Office, particularly in view of the parallel often
drawn between land patents and patents of invention, as expressed
by the Supreme Court in American Bell:
The power, therefore, to issue a patent for an invention, and the authority to issue such an instrument for
a grant of land, emanate from the same source; and,
although exercised by different bureaus or officers
239
240
241

Id. at 593 (citation omitted).
96 U.S. 530 (1877).
Id. at 533–34 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. v. Stone, 69 U.S. 525, 535 (1864)).
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under the government, are of the same nature,
character, and validity, and imply in each case the
exercise of the power of the government according
to modes regulated by acts of congress.242
Indeed, the Supreme Court has only acknowledged a limited scope
for the Patent Office to exercise authority over title after a patent has
been granted. Exceptions to the Executive Department’s general
lack of power over patents exist where there is “fraud in the
patentee,” as discussed above,243 or where patents are “issued unadvisedly or by mistake, or where the officer has no authority in law
to grant them, or where another party has a higher equity, and should
have received the patent.”244 In such cases, “the right of the United
States to interfere . . . is its obligation to protect the public from the
monopoly of the patent which was procured” by those means.245
Even so, and as also discussed above,246 the Supreme Court in American Bell affirmed only “the power of the government of the United
States to get rid of a patent [that was] obtained from it by fraud and
deceit,” despite an act by the legislature to give “private individuals
a more limited form of relief, by way of defense to an action by the
patentee.”247
B. Private Rights vs. Protection of the Public
A dilemma, therefore, appears in the nature of private property
that would ban the government from unilaterally withdrawing a
grant of patent without being a party to any challenge to its validity,
but would nevertheless seem to involve an interest by the government in protecting the public from patents improperly granted.
Resolution can be found in the nature of proceedings authorized by
Congress to address issues of fraud by the patentee, mistake by the
Patent Office, and “higher equity” among inventors. In other words,
while a limited exclusionary right to inventions is granted by the
Constitution, Congress has defined the manner in which patents are
242
243
244
245
246
247

American Bell, 128 U.S. at 358–59.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
American Bell, 128 U.S. at 365.
Id. at 367.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
American Bell, 128 U.S. at 373.
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to be granted. On one hand, if a granted patent is private property, it
is protected by the Judiciary under Article III of the Constitution.
On the other hand, the legislative and executive branches are
charged with protecting the public’s legitimate interest against
mistakes made by the granting authority, which is the Patent Office.
Referring back to Northern Pipeline,248 bankruptcy courts under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 were declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court because, even though designated “adjunct” courts,
they issued “final judgments, which are binding and enforceable
even in the absence of an appeal.”249 Accordingly, they could exercise “jurisdiction behind the façade of a grant to the district courts,
and are exercising powers far greater than those lodged in the
adjuncts approved in . . . either Crowell” or another Supreme Court
Case, United States v. Raddatz.250 The Court in Northern Pipeline
viewed Crowell and Raddatz as recognizing the “delicate accommodations required by the principle of separation of powers reflected
in Art. III”251 that limited the powers of an adjunct court, at least in
bankruptcy proceedings, by:
(1) making “only specialized, narrowly confined
factual determinations regarding a particularized area of law”;
(2) engaging in “statutorily channeled fact-finding
functions”;
(3) possession of “only a limited power to issue . . .
orders pursuant to specialized procedures”;
(4) susceptibility to having such orders “set aside
if ‘not supported by the evidence,’” instead of
“the more deferential ‘clearly erroneous’
standard”; and
(5) enforcement enabled only by order of a district
court.252

248

See supra notes 199–203 and accompanying text.
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85–86 (1982).
250
Id. at 86 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667 (1980)).
251
Id. at 83.
252
Id. at 85.
249
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In Northern Pipeline, the Court distinguished between “rights
created by Congress and other rights,” including “a critical difference between rights created by federal statute and rights recognized
by the Constitution.”253 If “the right being adjudicated is not of
congressional creation,”254 then:
[S]ubstantial inroads into functions that have traditionally been performed by the Judiciary cannot be
characterized merely as incidental extensions of
Congress’ power to define rights that it has created.
Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the United States,
which our Constitution reserves for Art. III courts.255
In the case of Northern Pipeline, for example, the claims involved
rights created by state law, “independent of and antecedent to the
reorganization petition that conferred jurisdiction upon the
Bankruptcy Court.”256 The Court, therefore, upheld the District
Court decision dismissing a suit for breach of contract in a United
States bankruptcy court on the ground that the Bankruptcy Act of
1978, by reaching rights created by state law, was unconstitutional
under Article III.257
If patents of invention ultimately are deemed to be “recognized
by the Constitution,” such as by virtue of Article I, Section 8, Clause
8, which states that Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote
the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . .
inventors the exclusive right to their . . . Discoveries,”258 and if those
exclusive rights are ultimately held to be “private rights,” those
rights would be protected by the Constitution under the Fifth
Amendment, which states:

253
254
255
256
257
258

Id. at 83 (emphasis added).
Id. at 84.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 88.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.259
Following the reasoning of Northern Pipeline, legislative acts that
make “substantial inroads” into functions affecting the validity of
granted patents, activities that traditionally have been within the
exclusive purview of the Judiciary, constitute “unwarranted
encroachments upon the judicial power of the United States, which
our Constitution reserves for Article III courts.”260 Moreover, as
the Supreme Court indicated in Williams v. United States, such acts
would be contrary to the well-established doctrine prohibiting Congress from depositing judicial power in legislative (non-Article III)
courts:
[W]here a controversy is of such a character as to
require the exercise of the judicial power defined by
[A]rticle 3, jurisdiction thereof can be conferred only
on courts established in virtue of that [A]rticle, and
that Congress is without power to vest that judicial
power in any other judicial tribunal, or, of course, in
an executive officer, or administrative or executive
board, since, to repeat the language of Chief Justice
Marshall in American Insurance Company et al. v.
Canter, . . . “they are incapable of receiving it.”261
Therefore, establishment of any tribunal empowered to retract
exclusive rights secured in granted patents would “far exceed the
powers that it has vested in administrative agencies that adjudicate
only rights of Congress’ own creation.”262

259

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84.
261
Williams v. United States, 282 U.S. 553, 578 (1933) (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter,
26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828)).
262
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84.
260
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C. Resolution of Competing Private and Public Interests in
Patents, and Recent Decisions by the Federal Circuit
If patent rights are private, and broad authority of the Board is
an unnecessary encroachment, then resolution can be found in limitation of post-issuance review of patent rights by the PTAB to the
guidelines set forth in Northern Pipeline.263 Guidelines for the
Board should be “statutorily defined,” enabling possession of “only
a limited power to issue . . . orders pursuant to specialized procedures” and enforceable only by a district court, which would set
aside any such order if “not supported by the evidence.”264 To ignore
these limiting principles would, as stated by the Court in Northern
Pipeline,
require that we replace the principles delineated in
our precedents, rooted in history and the Constitution, with a rule of broad legislative discretion that
could effectively eviscerate the constitutional guarantee of an independent Judicial Branch of the
Federal Government.265
Again operating on the assumption that patent rights are private, such “evisceration” may, in fact, have already been the
consequence, at least with respect to patents of invention, in MCM
Portfolio LLC. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., where the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit recently held that “patent rights are public
rights, and their validity susceptible to review by an administrative
agency.”266 The Court based its decision on earlier lower court
decisions that were only tangentially associated with Article III, and
distinguished certain Supreme Court precedent. For example,
according to the Federal Circuit in MCM Portfolio, McCormick was
limited to reissue proceedings, which held only that, “[w]ithout
statutory authorization,” cancellation of a patent without surrender
of the patent by the patent owner would be a deprivation of due

263
264
265
266

Id. at 85; see also supra note 252 and accompanying text.
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85.
Id. at 74.
MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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process of law.267 The Federal Circuit concluded that McCormick
“did not address Article III and certainly did not forbid Congress
from granting the PTO the authority to correct or cancel an issued
patent,”268 and relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas
that Congress “‘may create a seemingly “private” right that is so
closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter
appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the
Article III judiciary.’”269 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Stern was
also quoted, stating that “public rights doctrine [can apply] to disputes between private parties” where “the claim at issue derives
from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim
by an expert government agency is deemed essential to the limited
regulatory objective within the agency’s authority.”270 The Federal
Circuit deemed “the PTO . . . ‘an executive agency with specific
authority and expertise’ in the patent law,” and stated that “[i]t
would be odd indeed if Congress could not authorize the PTO to
reconsider its own decisions.”271
The court in MCM Portfolio drew a parallel with reexamination
proceedings, which are available to “any person” who can establish,
on the basis of lack of novelty, under 35 U.S.C. § 102, or obviousness, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, a “substantial new question of patentability.”272 The Federal Circuit decisions of Joy Technologies v.
267

Id. at 1289 (“Without statutory authorization, an ‘attempt [by the Commissioner of
Patents] to cancel a patent upon an application for reissue when the first patent is
considered invalid by the examiner . . . would be to deprive the applicant of his property
without due process of law, and would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch of the
government by the executive.’”) (quoting McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman,
169 U.S. 606, 612 (1898)). The Court in MCM Portfolio also cited American Bell “noting
lack of statutory authority for the Patent Office to cancel patents.” Id. (citing United States
v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 364–65 (1888)).
268
MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at 1289.
269
Id. at 1290 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593–
94 (1985) (emphasis added)).
270
Id. at 1290 (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 490 (2011)).
271
Id. at 1290–91 (quoting Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431 (2012)).
272
35 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). After enactment of the AIA only ex parte reexamination is
available. From 1999 to 2011, another alternative, inter partes reexamination, which
allowed greater participation by third parties beyond petitioning for reexamination, was
available under 35 U.S.C. § 311. The AIA ended inter partes reexamination. See 2601
Introduction [R-07.2015], U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/s2601.html [https://perma.cc/438N-F4VH].
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Manbeck 273 and Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff 274 were, for the court
in MCM Portfolio, “controlling authority” for the proposition that
inter partes review, like reexamination in Joy and Patlex, does not
violate Article III because “the issuance of a valid patent is primarily
a public concern and involves a ‘right that can only be conferred by
the government’ even though validity often is brought into question
in disputes between private parties.”275 The inference by the Court
in MCM Portfolio was that issued patents are a concern that involves
a “public right.” The Court in Joy was even move direct, stating that
“[n]othing in Granfinanciera . . . casts doubt on the Patlex court’s
holding that a valid patent involves public rights,”276 and further
concluded that they “need not reach Joy’s argument that it was
deprived of private rights.”277 However, the Federal Circuit in
Patlex did not explicitly say that patents were “public rights,” but
instead invoked only “favored treatment from the courts” toward
“curative statutes” based on the Supreme Court decision of Graham
& Foster v. Goodcell that hinged legislative intervention to cure
“mistake of officers purporting to administer the law in the name of
the Government” on a “lack of substantial equity” in an “asserted
vested right.”278
Further, and contrary to the contention of the Federal Circuit
in MCM Portfolio, the McCormick court did not imply that the
capacity of the PTO to “correct or cancel” a patent was simply a
function of “statutory authorization.”279 Moreover, it would not
make sense for the Court in McCormick, nor in American Bell for
that matter, to do so because the result would leave the doctrine of
273

Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 595 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
275
MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Joy, 959 F.2d at 228).
276
Joy, 959 F.2d at 229.
277
Id.
278
Patlex, 758 F.2d at 603 (quoting Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 429
(1931)). The Court in Graham stated:
Where the asserted vested right, not being linked to any substantial
equity, arises from the mistake of officers purporting to administer the
law in the name of the Government, the legislature is not prevented
from curing the defect in administration simply because the effect may
be to destroy causes of action which would otherwise exist.
Id. (emphasis added).
279
MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at 1289.
274
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separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches solely to the discretion of the legislative branch—a clear
misunderstanding of this fundamental concept. It should also be
noted that neither Thomas nor Stern involved the grant of patent
rights and, therefore, did not recognize the well-established premise
asserted in Stone that a “patent is the highest evidence of title, and
is conclusive as against the Government, and all claiming under
junior patents or titles, until it is set aside or annulled by some
judicial tribunal.”280
While acknowledging that patents are “property,” and that
patent owners have a Fifth Amendment right to due process, Judge
Newman in Patlex stopped short of calling patents “public rights”
and cited no Supreme Court authority for that proposition. Rather,
Judge Newman concluded only that patents are a “public concern”
that justified the “overriding public purpose” of “curative statutes.”281 Following the policy of “favorable treatment” indicated by
the Court in Graham toward “curative statutes,” the “overriding
public purpose” was given “great weight” by the district court and
by the Federal Circuit in Patlex, and the Federal Circuit determined
that Congress did not act in an arbitrary and irrational way to achieve
its desired purposes.282 Significantly, for our purposes, the relevant
legislative history of reexamination proceedings that constituted the
“overriding public purpose,” as summarized by the Federal Circuit
in Patlex, included, as one component, the expertise of the Patent

280

United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. 525, 535 (1864); see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
281
Patlex, 758 F.2d at 603–04.
282
Id. The court in Patlex stated:
We conclude, as did the district court, that the overriding public
purposes Congress articulated in enacting the reexamination law with
retroactive effect are entitled to great weight, and that Congress did
not act in an arbitrary and irrational way to achieve its desired
purposes. We affirm the district court in upholding the validity of the
retroactive [reexamination] statute against Gould’s challenge under the
Fifth Amendment.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Office, as “‘an aid’ to the trial court ‘in making an informed decision on the patent’s validity.’”283 This language is consistent with
contribution by the Patent Office as a fact-finding adjunct to an
Article III district court, as discussed above.
Generally, however, reexamination is conducted at the Patent
Office according to “procedures established for initial examination.”284 Appeal from a decision by the PTAB is to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,285 and in the absence of appeal
the judgment of the PTAB is enforceable. Therefore, contrary to the
statement made by the Federal Circuit in Patlex, there is no “trial
court” to be aided by reexamination, unless either the PTAB, which
is part of the Patent Office under the Department of Commerce,
or the Federal Circuit, which is a court of appeals, is to be so considered. Recognition of this discrepancy should have nullified the
“great weight” the Federal Circuit allotted to any “overriding purpose” behind “enacting the reexamination law.”286
Overall, the Federal Circuit in MCM Portfolio did not rely on
Supreme Court authority for the assertion that granted patents of
invention are “public rights.” Other than Oil States, no such authority exists to date. Even Patlex and Joy, both of which are lower
appeals court decisions, did not conclude that patents are “public
rights.” The court in Patlex instead opted for the “public purpose of
the improved administration of law” without regard for the “vested

283
Id. at 602 (quoting Patent Reexamination Hearings, supra note 32) (emphasis added).
Specifically, as recited by the court in Patlex:
The bill’s proponents foresaw three principal benefits. First, the new
procedure could settle validity disputes more quickly and less
expensively than the often protracted litigation involved in such cases.
Second, the procedure would allow courts to refer patent validity
questions to the expertise of the Patent Office. See Senate Hearings at
1, wherein Senator Bayh said that reexamination would be “an aid” to
the trial court “in making an informed decision on the patent’s
validity.” Third, reexamination would reinforce “investor confidence
in the certainty of patent rights” by affording the PTO a broader
opportunity to review “doubtful patents.” 126 Cong. Rec. 29,895
(1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
Id. (emphasis added).
284
35 U.S.C. § 305.
285
See id. §§ 306, 141(b).
286
Patlex, 758 F.2d at 603; see also supra note 282 and accompanying text.
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right” that is linked to the “substantial equity” conferred by the grant
of a patent,287 going no further than to conclude that patents are “primarily a public concern.”288 The court in Joy, in turn, perfunctorily
demurred to Patlex as controlling authority,289 but inferred, as did
the Patlex court, that a “patent involves public rights.”290
The conclusion by MCM Portfolio that “patent rights are public
rights” is not a correct interpretation of Patlex, which the court then
held up as binding precedent. However, even if the absence of MCM
Portfolio had limited its understanding of Patlex to an assertion
that patents are a “public concern,” the “great weight” granted by
Patlex to favor “curative statutes” to thereby achieve an “overriding
purpose” of “substantial equity” is misguided. “Curative statutes”
should not be given deference based on intent. Rather, a clear understanding of constitutional separation of powers must be applied
to analyze the mechanics and effect of any new legislation in order
to assess whether or not that legislation is, in fact, “curative.”
VI. DOUBLE JEOPARDY: PATENTS AS CONTRACTS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OVERLAPPING UNILATERAL REVOCATION
BY THE GOVERNMENT
Patents have been considered contracts since the eighteenth century when, in England, the requirement to work an invention for the
public good, made in exchange for an exclusive right as a matter of
judicial favor, or privilege, was substituted with a contractual right
to exclude in consideration for public disclosure of how to practice
that invention. This transition is the basis for modern jurisprudence
in patent law, and failure to incorporate the resulting distinction in
recent post-grant examination proceedings puts patentees in double
jeopardy of losing those rights, contrary to the motivation behind
this legislation. Part VI.A is an analysis of patents as contracts. Part
VI.B establishes an affirmative link between inter partes review and
287

See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604.
289
Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 229 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Because Patlex is
controlling authority and has not been impaired by either of the subsequent Supreme Court
cases cited by Joy, we reject Joy’s attack on that decision.”).
290
Id.
288
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its older cousin, ex parte reexamination, and explores some problems consequent to post grant examination in a non-Article III
tribunal. Part VI.C is a general plea for reconsideration of all postgrant patent examination proceedings that are available to “a person
who is not the owner of the patent,” as called for by the statutory
provision for IPRs.291
A. Patents as “Contracts”
Regardless of whether patents are considered to be public or private rights, monopolies, franchises, or property, it is generally
agreed that they are contracts between the Government and the
patentee. Justice Gorsuch alluded to the contractual nature of patents
in his dissent in Oil States, and to the continuity of that understanding as patents transitioned from “little more than feudal favors”292
judged by the King’s Privy Council, to “procompetitive means to
secure to individuals the fruits of their labor and ingenuity”293 that
were to be “adjudicated solely by the law courts” thereafter.294
Justice Gorsuch quoted Walterscheid to suggest that the U.S.
Constitution adopted this revised view:
The Constitution itself reflects this new thinking,
authorizing the issuance of patents precisely because
of their contribution to the “Progress of Science and
useful Arts.” Art. 1 § 8, cl. 8. “In essence, there was
a change in perception—from viewing a patent as
a contract between the crown and the patentee to
viewing it as a ‘social contract’ between the patentee
and society.”295

291

35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a person who is not the
owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of
the patent.”).
292
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1382
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
293
Id.
294
Id. (quoting Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual
History, 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1258, 1286–87 (2001)).
295
Id. (quoting Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent
Law: Antecedents (Part 3), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 771, 793 (1995)).
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“Society” is, of course, represented by the government within the
framework of the “social contract.”296
Contracts then, as now, presume some kind of consideration,
even if that contract is with the government.297 For patents, that consideration, both in England and in colonial America, typically was a
requirement to work the invention.298 By the late eighteenth century,
however, the requirement to work an invention was replaced
by a requirement that the inventor disclose the invention to the

296

See supra note 237 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Am. Bell Tel.
Co., 128 U.S. 315, 362–63 (1888) (“We have no king in this country; we have here no
prerogative right of the crown . . . . The patent, then . . . is not subject to be repealed or
revoked by the president, the secretary of the interior, or the commissioner of patents, when
once issued.”).
297
See, e.g., W.J. Kelly, The Concept of Consideration in Government Contracts, 10
U.S.A.F. JAG L. REV. 20, 20 (1968) (“All contracts require consideration and Government
contracts no less than those between private parties must be supported by consideration to
be valid and enforcible [sic].”) (citing Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S.
489 (1922); William Atwater & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 495 (1922)).
298
CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT
SYSTEM, 1660–1800, at 12 (1988) (“Patentees were required to implement their ‘invention’
without delay and ensure its continuance by communicating the necessary skills to native
workmen. The grant was revocable if these conditions were not met.”); see also Edward C.
Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the U.S. Patent Law: Antecedents (5, Part II), 78 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 665, 670 (1996). Waterscheid quotes a patent granted by
New York in 1780 to Henry Guest:
Provided nevertheless that the grant hereby made shall not take effect
until the said Henry Guest shall have filed in the secretary’s office in
this State, a writing containing the names and description of the
materials aforesaid, and the method and process of making such
blubber and oyl, or a substitute of blubber and oyl; nor until the said
Henry Guest shall have a manufactory erected for the purpose, and
shall have made such blubber or oyl, of the materials aforesaid, within
this State.
Id. (quoting 1 Laws of the State of New York (Albany 1886–87) at 277–78).

2020]

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

713

public.299 In the United States, since the Patent Act of 1790, patentees were required to describe their invention300 and, with only some
299

H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION 1750–1852, at 22 (1984):
The final justification for patents was the exchange-for-secrets thesis,
or the disclosure agreement. It was based on the eighteenth-century
idea of contract, where society and the inventor made a bargain, one
offering temporary protection, the other knowledge of new techniques.
This rationale had its origins in the Elizabethan period, although then
disclosure was of a quite different form. Inventors were compelled to
use the patent to introduce the trade, and to teach the mystery of the art
to native tradesmen. In the early eighteenth century the form and
condition of disclosure changed. Patentees now had to describe the
nature and manner of their inventions in a specification. . . .
See also MACLEOD, supra note 298, at 49:
Increasing emphasis by the judiciary on accurate and full specification
culminated in Lord Mansfield’s decision in Liardet v. Johnson (1778).
This stipulated that the specification should be sufficiently full and
detailed to enable anyone, skilled in the art or trade to which the
invention pertained, to understand and apply it without further
experiment. For the first time, the recognized quid pro quo for the
award of a patent was the disclosure of the invention.
300
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (Apr. 10, 1790) (repealed 1793) (current
version at 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018)). Section 2 of the Patent Act of 1790 included a
requirement that:
[T]he grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the time of granting
the same, deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in writing,
containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and
explanations and models . . . of the thing or things, by him or them
invented or discovered . . . .
***
[The] specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as
not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other things
before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person
skilled in the art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith
it may be nearest connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the
end that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the
expiration of the patent term . . . .
See also ALAIN POTTAGE & BRAD SHERMAN, FIGURES OF INVENTION: A HISTORY OF
MODERN PATENT LAW 53, 59 (Oxford University Press 2010). Pottage and Sherman argue
that specifications in the United States were introduced on “different principles from the
ones that had developed in England and Europe” at least because “the text [in the United
States] was explicitly seen through the medium of a contract rather than as a grant of a
privilege.” Id. at 53. They further stated that, “[i]n part, this was a product of the ‘republican
idiom,’” which they, nevertheless, related to the notion of patents as “contracts”:
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administrative interference, those descriptions have been made
available to the public by the Patent Office.301
As previously discussed, Justice Thomas mischaracterized the
significance of American Bell in Oil States when he explained that,
“[b]y ‘issuing patents,’ the PTO ‘take[s] from the public rights of
immense value, and bestow[s] them upon the patentee,’”302 in that
the Court in American Bell was not relying on the “immense value”
of “public rights” to justify unilateral power of the Patent Office
to decide the fate of granted patents. Rather, the Court was only
referring to prior activity or omission that would permit “cancellation or vacation of an instrument” obtained from the Patent
Office.303 The scope of instances identified in American Bell for
cancellation of a patent were laid out in dicta as including “fraud in
the patentee,” patents “issued unadvisedly or by mistake, where the
office has no authority in law to grant them, or where another party
has a higher equity, and should have received the patent.”304
Patents of invention are distinct from land patents in at least one
respect, in that only patents in land are taken from the public domain. Stated conversely, unlike grants of land, patents of invention,
if properly granted, have never been a possession of a sovereign

Ideas were construed as things because they could be written
down . . . .
***
This was reinforced by the fact that the republican idiom that
underpinned American patent law (which was expressly influenced by
developments in France) meant that the specification tended to be seen
as a contract or bargain between the inventor and the state.
Id. at 59.
301
Id. at 56. Interestingly, William Thornton, the First Superintendent of Patents, from
1802–1828, according to Walterscheid, “took the position that a specification [of a granted
patent] could only be made available (a) if litigation was involved, or (b) if the inventor
expressly authorized it, or (c) if the term of the patent had expired.” EDWARD C.
WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW &
ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836, at 283 (1998)). This policy was reversed in 1825: “[S]ince
1825 it has been the policy of the United States that any issued patent is available to the
public upon payment of the requisite fee.” Id. at 302–03.
302
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373
(2018) (quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888)).
303
American Bell, 128 U.S. at 373.
304
Id. at 365.
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entity, whether that be a hereditary monarch or a government representative.305 Patents of invention, therefore, are different, despite the
parallel drawn by the Court in American Bell that they are of the
same “nature, character, and validity” as land patents and “imply in
each case the exercise of the power of the government according to
modes regulated by acts of Congress.”306
One consequential difference between patents of invention and
land patents is the nature of the consideration offered in exchange
for the grant. While abandonment or failure to make payment might
be cause for revocation of a land patent, just as failure to work an
invention was once a basis for revocation of a patent of invention,
disclosure of an invention by a patent applicant cannot be undone.
An invention is publicly disclosed once a patent of invention is
granted in the United States, and this disclosure constitutes irrevocable consideration by the patent applicant in exchange for the
305

Deazley acknowledges difficulty in classifying intellectual properties, including
copyright, trademark, and patent protection, as contrasted with other forms of property. See
RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT—HISTORY, THEORY, LANGUAGE 141, 143–144,
165 (2006). He states that “they are akin to choses in action, in that they are abstract legal
rights . . . [and so] are not rights in rem. On the other hand, neither do they represent a
claim to receive some share or amount of another’s pre-existing property, as does a chose
in action.” Id. at 141 (third emphasis added). He goes on to point out that “John Locke
[1632–1704] himself did not consider that his theory of property extended to intellectual
properties such as copyrights and patents.” Id. at 143–144 n.32. Although not directly
discussed by Deazley, a reason for Locke’s opinion in this regard may be that his theories,
such as that of the epigraph to this Article, pre-date the Statute of Anne (1710) respecting
copyright, and at that time patents were generally considered privileges granted at the
discretion of the crown, as discussed above. With respect to copyright, Deazley did,
however, quote a passage by Locke referencing a proposal to “vest a priviledg in the author
of the said book . . . .” Id. While Deazley considers intellectual properties to be monopolies,
he suggests using new terminology, such as “Intellectual Property Freedoms” and
“Intellectual Property Privileges,” in order to get away from entrenched views associated
with the notion of “intellectual property rights,” and to thereby enable more “meaningful
engagement with the implications of the interface between intellectual property and the
concept of monopoly . . . .” Id. at 165. In making this suggestion, Deazley does not
acknowledge that patents generally have not been considered to be privileges since the late
eighteenth century. Cf. id. Regardless, to avoid confusion (i.e., Deazley’s “Phil Collins”
conundrum, where “the sheer weight of the collective national and international
consciousness, with its embedded system of cultural significance, presents a substantial
challenge” to others (such as Phil Collins, the photographer, as opposed to the musician
bearing the same name)), and for the purposes of this Article, use of the phrase “intellectual
property rights” will be continued. See id. at 163–65.
306
American Bell, 128 U.S. at 359.
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limited temporal exclusionary right to make, use, sell, offer to sell,
or import the invention in the United States.307
This distinction was picked up in 2000 by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. v.
Samsung Electronics Co., discussed above,308 which denied defendant “Samsung’s attempt to analogize a patent to a franchise for
purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes.”309 The court in Semiconductor Energy Laboratory relied, in particular, on the 1888
Supreme Court case California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., also
discussed above, to distinguish “franchises” as legislative carve-outs
from public property for development.310 Implicit in this view of a
“franchise” is that the subject matter over which eminent domain is
exercised was first in the possession of the public and, therefore,
available to be taken out of that domain to create the franchise. As
stated by the Federal Circuit in Semiconductor Energy Laboratory,
“[b]y contrast, the patent right to exclude a party from practicing a
particular invention is never held by the sovereign, but only by the
patentee after issuance.”311 The exclusionary right granted by the
government is obtained in exchange for disclosure by the patent
applicant. That disclosure, once the patent is granted, cannot be
restored if the government, as grantee, decides at some later time to
reconsider, such as during inter partes review.312 Any type of post307

Since enactment of the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA) in 1999, patent
applications are automatically published eighteen months after filing. Pre-issuance
publication could only be reserved in the U.S. application if the applicant committed at the
time of filing not to file in other countries. American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2018)).
Disclosure is best viewed, at the very least, as consideration in anticipation of a grant of a
patent by the PTO, subject, of course, to substantive examination by the PTO prerequisite
to said grant.
308
See supra text accompanying notes 165–70.
309
Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
310
See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also Semiconductor, 204 F.3d at 1380
(“A franchise involves a transfer of extant rights previously held exclusively by the
sovereign.”) (citing California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 40 (1888)).
311
Semiconductor, 204 F.3d at 1380.
312
Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374 (“Inter partes review is ‘a second look at an earlier
administration grant’ . . . . Thus, inter partes review involves the same interests as the
determination to grant a patent in the first place.”) (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., L.L.C.
v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016); United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 586 (1899)).
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grant examination, therefore, creates an irrevocability problem for
patentees that is compounded by the fact that the threshold for
revoking a patent under post-grant procedure is a preponderance of
the evidence,313 which is much lower than the clear and convincing
evidence standard applied by Article III courts to overcome the
presumption of validity mandated by 35 U.S.C. § 282(a)(ii).314
The idea of disclosure as consideration in exchange for an
exclusionary right is not new. Biagioli, for example, recites Joseph
Barnes, John Fitch’s nemesis in the steamboat interference cases of
the 1780’s and 1790’s,315 as the first invocation of a “patent bargain”
between an inventor and the public in the United States:
313

35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (“Evidential Standard—In an inter partes review instituted under
this chapter, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability
by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
314
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“In general—A patent shall be presumed valid.”); see
also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 101 (2011). There, the Court stated:
Our decision in RCA is authoritative. There, tracing nearly a century
of case law from this Court and others, Justice Cardozo wrote for a
unanimous Court that “there is a presumption of validity, a presumption not to be overthrown except by clear and cogent evidence.”
Although the “force” of the presumption found “varying expression”
in this Court and elsewhere, Justice Cardozo explained, one “common
core of thought and truth” unified the decisions:
“[O]ne otherwise an infringer who assails the validity of a patent
fair upon its face bears a heavy burden of persuasion, and fails
unless his evidence has more than a dubious preponderance. If
that is true where the assailant connects himself in some way with
the title of the true inventor, it is so a fortiori where he is a
stranger to the invention, without claim of title of his own. If it is
true where the assailant launches his attack with evidence
different, at least in form, from any theretofore produced in
opposition to the patent, it is so a bit more clearly where the
evidence is even verbally the same.” Id. at 8, 55 S. Ct. 928
(internal citation omitted).
The common-law presumption, in other words, reflected the universal
understanding that a preponderance standard of proof was too
“dubious” as a basis to deem a patent invalid. Ibid: see also id., at 7,
55 S. Ct. 928 (“[A] patent . . . is presumed to be valid until the
presumption has been overcome by convincing evidence of error”)
(internal citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (1935)) (internal
citations omitted).
315
See generally THOMAS BOYD, POOR JOHN FITCH: INVENTOR OF THE STEAMBOAT
(1935).
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The earliest appearance of the image of the patent
bargain in the United States is probably in Barnes
(1792): “The property or right in a discovery being
exclusively the inventor’s, having had its origin, and
existing but in his mind; it follows, that a system for
securing property in the products of genius, is a
mutual contract between the inventor and the public,
in which the inventor agrees, on proviso that the
public will secure to him his property in, and the
exclusive use of his discovery for a limited time, he
will, at the expiration of such time, cede his right in
the same to the public: thenceforth the discovery is
common right, being the compensation required by
the public, stipulated in the contract, for having thus
secured the same.”316
Robinson is also relied upon by Biagioli as an example of expression
of the notion that patents are contracts, and that disclosure is
consideration given by inventors in exchange for exclusionary rights
for a limited period of time. As quoted from Robinson by Biagioli:
A patent is a contract between the inventor and the
public, by which the inventor, in consideration that
the exclusive use of his invention is secured to him
for a limited period of time, confers upon the public
the knowledge of the invention during that period and
an unrestricted right to use it after that period has
expired . . . [.] The specification is the instrument in
which the terms of these mutual considerations and
promises are declared, and on its completeness and
accuracy depends the validity and the value of the
contract itself.317
For Biagioli, the quid pro quo of “the patent bargain” conferred
by the government is the specification, which, reciting Fessendon’s
316

Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic: Representing Inventions, Constructing Rights of
Authors, 73 SOC. RES. 1129, 1130 n.4 (2006) (citing JOSEPH BARNES, TREATISE ON THE
JUSTICE, POLICY, AND UTILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTUAL SYSTEM OF PROMOTING THE
PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS BY ASSURING PROPERTY IN THE PRODUCTS OF GENIUS (1792)).
317
Id. at 1131 (quoting WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS, VOL. II (1890)) (emphasis added).
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treatise of 1810, “is the price . . . the patentee is to pay for
his monopoly.”318
Bottomley picks up on Biagioli’s theme, and offers language
from Liardet v. Johnson, the first case understood to exemplify
“patent as contract” doctrine, in 1778:
Hence the law requires as the price the patentee
should pay to the public for his monopoly, that he
should, to the very best of his knowledge, give the
fullest and most sufficient description of all the
particulars on which the effect depends.319
For Bottomley, disclosure of the invention came to be viewed as
consideration given by the individual for the contractual grant of a
limited period of exclusionary rights, which he directly links to a
shift from consideration of “public good” to one of disclosure:
[T]he chances of a patent being challenged in the
Privy Council had been receding since 1688 and
the Court of Chancery had already emerged as a
jurisdiction in which patents could be enforced. Soon
after, the introduction of the specification, which
became mandatory in the 1730’s, heralded a fundamental change in the nature of the patent . . . . [T]he
specification requirement displaced the “public
good” as the consideration on which the patent was
awarded . . . .320
Bottomley views disclosure to be the patentee’s portion of the
exchange that is the basis of modern intellectual property rights:
In a system of privileges [under the Privy Council],
the consideration on which the grant is made is one
of “utility,” that the invention is of direct economic
benefit . . . . In contrast, with the introduction of the
specification, the consideration of the patent grant is
318

Id. at n.5 (quoting THOMAS FESSENDON, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW
INVENTIONS: WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING THE FRENCH PATENT LAW, FORMS 49
(1810)).
319
SEAN BOTTOMLEY, THE BRITISH PATENT SYSTEM DURING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION 1700–1852, at 88 (2014) (quoting Liardet v. Johnson (1778), 1 HPC 198).
320
Id. at 171.
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supposed to change. Now the patent is awarded for
disclosing the invention via the specification. It is
this reciprocal agreement . . . that underpins any
modern intellectual property rights regime.321
More particularly, while patents in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries had been granted based on the “utility,” or economic
benefit to be conferred by practicing the invention, during the
eighteenth century public disclosure of the invention in a specification eventually replaced the requirement for use322 and patents
were no longer considered privileges but, rather, common-law
property rights that were not contingent upon practice of the invention by patentees.323 Bottomley, therefore, concurs with Baigioli’s
“theoretical schema” that an increasing reliance on sufficiency of a
written description of an invention was contemporaneous with a
shift in the early eighteenth century away from viewing patents as
“privileges” that are granted by a monarch and judged by the Privy
Council for contribution to the “public good,” and toward an equitable right in property.324
B. The Link Between Inter Partes Review and Ex Parte
Reexamination
Inter partes review (as well as post-grant review and covered
business methods) are linked to the older proceeding of ex parte
reexamination in that all of them can be initiated by the Patent Office
by “a person” who would not necessarily have standing to challenge
321

Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 49 (“From the mid-eighteenth century onwards, the judiciary eschewed the
public good as a matter for enquiry and instead concerned themselves with the sufficiency
of the specification.”).
323
Id. at 173 (“Before 1760, the beginning of the classical Industrial Revolution, the
Privy Council had already yielded jurisdiction of patent cases to the equity and common
law courts, and the specification had transformed the jurisprudential foundation of the
entire system.”).
324
Id. at 46–49 (“Mario Biagioli argues that it is only with this written requirement that
there is a shift away from patents as early modes or privileges to patents as intellectual
property rights . . . . The evidence from the [earliest] reports [where a specification was
ordered] indicate developments consistent with Biagioli’s theoretical schema.
Significantly, there was a concomitant decline in the extent to which the law officers
examined the petition with a view to the ‘public good.’”) (citing Biagioli, supra note 316,
at 1131).
322
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a granted patent in an Article III court. Jurisdiction over the validity
of granted patents overlaps between the Patent Office and Article III
courts, putting patentees in double jeopardy of losing rights they
contracted for with the government in consideration for disclosure
of their inventions. Part VI.B.1 is a description of the systemic
causes of overlapping jurisdiction, and Part VI.B.2 is a case study of
overlapping jurisdiction in the context of reexamination, a case
study that is now being replicated in more recent proceedings
established for post-grant patent examination under the AIA.
1. Overlapping Jurisdiction Consequent to Third-Party
Standing
At oral hearing before the Supreme Court, appellant Oil States
attempted to distinguish between reexamination proceedings and
inter partes review by stating that reexamination is “fundamentally
examinational,” while inter partes review is “adjudicational.”325 No
real explanation was provided for this distinction during the oral
hearing except for the statement by Oil States that third party
participation during reexamination proceedings, whether ex parte or
inter partes, was “fundamentally a proceeding between the Patent
and Trademark Office, between the Government and the patent
owner.”326 Presumably, then, the distinction between reexamination
proceedings on the one hand and inter partes review on the other
would be the fact of participation by third parties, whereby the “fundamental” nature of the proceeding changes from one that is
“between the Government and the patent owner” to a proceeding
that “fundamentally” includes the third party. There is no mention
of this distinction in any of the majority opinion, the concurrence by
Justice Breyer, or Justice Gorsuch’s dissent.
Perhaps the distinction is of no practical effect constitutionally,
in which case the constitutionality of reexamination may be linked
to that of inter partes review, and so should be discussed along
with any critique of the Supreme Court’s holding in Oil States.
Reexamination and inter partes review are, in fact, only two of
several alternative statutory provisions for post-grant examination
325
326

Transcript, supra note 14, at 4–5; see also supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
Transcript, supra note 14, at 4–5.
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of patents by the Patent Office. As previously discussed, post grant
examination proceedings other than reexamination and inter partes
review include reissue and interference, both of which date to
the middle of the nineteenth century, and the new proceedings
introduced with the AIA, namely, “post-grant review, covered
business methods, supplemental examination and statutory derivation proceedings.327
There is, however, at least one crucial distinction of the older
proceedings of reissue and interference proceedings from ex parte
reexamination, IPRs, PGRs, and CBMs, in that a third party in these
more recent proceedings need not have any interest in the validity
of the patent, other than as a member of the public, in order to
challenge a granted patent before the Patent Office.328 In interference proceedings, the Patent Office is only competent to make
determinations of priority between patent applications, or between a
patent application and a granted patent, and only when provoked by
another patent applicant, a patentee, or sua sponte by the Patent
Office to challenge a patent applicant. Similarly, only a patentee can
petition for reissue, and reissue is contingent upon surrender of the
subject patent by the patentee. In both cases, the patent applicant or
patentee provoking the interference or petitioning for reissue clearly
has a property right at stake beyond simply being a member of
the public.
It is this capacity for third party initiation that renders ex parte
reexaminations, IPRs, PGRs, and CBMs subject to scrutiny under
constitutional separation of powers, because members of the public
would lack standing in an Article III court. That the validity of
issued patents can be tried in Article I, or “legislative” courts, sets
up overlapping jurisdiction with “constitutional, or Article III
courts. As we will see, overlapping jurisdiction is a basis for confusion that attends current jurisprudence of reexamination and AIA
post-grant proceedings of IPRs, PGRs, and CBMs. However, because IPRs were the subject of Oil States, our constitutional analysis

327

See supra notes 4–7.
Petitions for derivation proceedings under 35 U.S.C. § 135 and requests for
supplemental examination under 35 U.S.C. § 257 are limited to patent applicants and patent
owners respectively.
328
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of post-grant proceedings will be limited to ex parte reexamination
and IPRs; PGRs and CBMs will not be addressed, but would
stand or fall with ex parte reexamination and IPRs for the reasons
just introduced.
2. A Case Study in Consequences of Reexamination of
Patents as Contracts—Fresenius USA v. Baxter
International
If patents are contracts and disclosure is the consideration given
by the patentee in exchange for a limited period of exclusivity, then
reexamination of a granted patent and revocation of that patent
without voluntary surrender of the patent by the patentee is a
violation of that contract by the government that cannot be
remedied, at least because the consideration of disclosure cannot be
restored to the patentee. Introduction of ex parte reexamination in
1980, in fact, was premised on a failure of the patent system to
“uphold [the government’s] agreement with an inventor that in
exchange for disclosure of new inventions the inventor’s rights will
be protected.”329 At the time, ex parte reexamination was posed as a
benefit to patentees that would provide greater assurance of validity
without the great expense of litigation.330 The proposed legislation
was met with little resistance; most testimony was enthusiastically
supportive, complete with that of the daughter of an inventor and
founder of a company that lost a patent in litigation:
We were shocked to read the judge’s ruling and to
find we had lost in all areas of our court fight—patent

329

Patent Reexamination Hearing, supra note 32, at 2.
See id.; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. As stated by Sen. Bayh:
While patents are important to all businesses, they are the lifeblood to
the independent or small business owner who uses the patent grant as
a shield to protect their invention from stronger competitors.
***
Having a patent issued [of] dubious worth is a cruel hoax that benefits
no one, least of all the patent holder. It is much better to be able to go
back to the Patent Office under a reexamination procedure to
determine the patent’s validity than it is to spend thousands of dollars
in court and wind up with an invalid patent.
Patent Reexamination Hearing, supra note 32, at 2.
330
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infringement, trademark infringement, unfair competition, and deceptive trade. The judge had ruled
against us based on gray areas of law—the obviousness doctrine and legal technicalities.331
The reality subsequent to enactment of reexamination proceedings
presents a much different picture, as summarized by commentators
such as Gregory Dolin, who argues that, despite provisions to curb
abuse, such as elevated fees to petition the Patent Office for
reexamination, patentees are put at a disadvantage.332 Furthermore,
reexamination has created what is effectively overlapping jurisdiction by the Patent Office and the judiciary over the validity of issued
patents, and has caused great confusion that undermines the reliance
placed on granted patent rights by both the patentee and the public.
For example, in Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter International,
Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district
court judgment of patent infringement, stating that the plaintiff,
Baxter International, Inc. (Baxter), no longer had a cause of action
following cancellation of the claims at issue by the Patent Office in
a reexamination proceeding.333 At issue was the finality of the
district court judgment in view of a determination of invalidity of
those claims by the PTAB during reexamination. More specifically,
the district court previously had granted a motion by Baxter for
judgement as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on claims of three patents
that had not been shown to be invalid and were determined by the
court to be infringed by the defendant.334 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court, in part, but affirmed the district
court’s grant of JMOL with respect to the claims of one of the three

331

Patent Reexamination Hearing, supra note 32, at 32.
See Dolin, supra note 8, at 913, 947 (“In short, the system designed by Congress is
working against the very goals announced by Congress. . . . The data and the case studies
presented in this Article show that the current system of post-issuance review can be, and
is, abused.”).
333
See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(Fresenius II) (“In light of the cancellation of Baxter’s remaining claims, Baxter no longer
has a viable cause of action against Fresenius. Therefore, the pending litigation is moot.
We vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.”).
334
See Fresenius Med. Care Holdings Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 03-1421, 2007 WL
518804 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007).
332
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patents at issue, and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the royalty award and injunction in light of the partial reversal
of the district court’s decision.335 On remand, the district court
awarded damages to Baxter in a final judgment dated March 16,
2012, which Fresenius appealed. Baxter cross-appealed, and on May
3, 2012, the district court granted Fresenius a stay of execution of
the judgment pending the outcome of the appeal.336
While Fresenius v. Baxter was on remand, the Federal Circuit,
in a separate proceeding, affirmed on May 17, 2012337 a decision by
the Patent Office in a reexamination proceeding, thereafter issuing
a mandate on November 2, 2012, that the claims at issue were
invalid.338 The holding in Baxter by the Federal Circuit was not
appealed by Baxter, the assignee of the patent and, accordingly, the
Patent Office terminated the reexamination and issued a certificate
canceling the claims,339 which were the same claims of the subject
patent that had been held by the Federal Circuit in Fresenius v.
Baxter to be not invalid and infringed.340
In Fresenius I, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that “the
cancellation of a patent’s claims cannot be used to reopen a final
damages judgment ending a suit based on those claims.”341 However, for the court, the issue was whether “the judgment in this
infringement case is sufficiently final so that it is immune to the
effect of the final judgment in the PTO proceedings, as affirmed by
this court in In re Baxter.”342 To make this determination, the court
found it “important here to distinguish between different concepts

335

See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Fresenius I).
336
See id. at 1334. The outcome of the appeal was Fresenius II, decided July 2, 2013.
337
See In re Baxter, 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, 698 F.3d 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
338
See Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1335. The mandate by the Federal Circuit affirming the
contemporaneous reexamination proceeding issued on November 2, 2012.
339
See id.; see also Ex parte Reexamination Certificate, U.S. Pat. No. 5,247,434 C1 (Apr.
30, 2013).
340
See Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1335.
341
Id. at 1340.
342
Id. at 1341.
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of finality,”343 concluding that the issue was not one of “dealing with
finality for purposes of determining the potential res judicata effect
of this infringement litigation on another suit,” but rather whether
the Federal Circuit’s previous decision remanding the district court
case was “sufficiently final to preclude application of the intervening final judgment in In re Baxter.”344 The Federal Circuit held that
their decision to “remand to the district court in Fresenius I did not
end the controversy between the parties, or leave ‘nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment.’”345 As a result, cancellation
of the claims at issue by the Patent Office by the time a decision on
remand could be made to execute the 2007 district court judgment
mooted reconsideration of the royalty award and injunction.
In a strongly worded dissent in Baxter, Judge Newman excoriated the majority opinion as a holding that “violates . . . the constitutional plan,” that has unlawfully “revised, overturned or
refused faith and credit”346 of “[j]udgments . . . [made] within the
power vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution.”347 Likewise, in a dissent to Fresenius II, Judge Newman
did not generally contest the constitutionality of reexamination
proceedings, but asserted that the “PTO can neither invalidate, nor
revive, a patent whose validity the court has adjudicated,” without
rendering “the court’s judgment no more than ‘advisory.’”348 She
then recited in her Fresenius II dissent the standard for finality in
each of the other federal district courts,349 none of which was so
strict that it “leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,” as required by the majority.350 According to Judge Newman
and the several federal district courts, finality is specific to issues
343

Id. at 1340. The court quoted 18A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4432 (2d ed. 2002)
(“Definitions of finality cannot automatically be carried over from appeals cases to
preclusion problems.”).
344
Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1341.
345
Id. (quoting Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1994))
(emphasis added).
346
In re Baxter, 678 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting).
347
Id.
348
Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1349 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Gordon v. United
States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1864)).
349
Id. at 1355–58.
350
Id. at 1341.
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that “were finally decided in full and fair litigation.”351 In this case,
the decision had been made with respect to patent validity and only
the issues of updating damages and the injunction consequent to that
determination remained.352
Regardless of any standard for finality, the overriding issue,
as stated by the district court, and as recited by Judge Newman,
was the opportunity allowed for parties to game the system by
employing reexamination as a “mere dilatory tactic.”353 As stated by
the district court:
Fresenius should not have waited until it had had a
trial, had litigated motions for judgement as a matter
of law and a new trial on the merits, and then had a
favorable PTO action to request a stay. Any irreparable harm that Fresenius will suffer will be of its own
making, attempting, as it did, to “game the system”
by playing both fields simultaneously . . . . [T]o
allow Fresenius to now derail this litigation would be
to sanction the most blatant abuse of the reexamination process. The express purpose of the reexamination procedure is to shift the burden from the courts
by reducing costly and time-consuming litigation.354
Yet the reexamination process failed to prevent costly litigation
from unfolding in this case, despite the President’s Commission on
the Patent System in 1966 setting before Congress the objectives to
“raise the quality and reliability of the U.S. Patent” and to “reduce
the expense of obtaining and litigating a patent.”355

351

Id. at 1354 (“All circuits impose finality and preclusion as to issues that were finally
decided in full and fair litigation.”).
352
Id. at 1359 (“Here, Fresenius contested liability and lost, by declaratory action brought
in the district court, and on appeal to the Federal Circuit. All that remained on remand was
an updating of the post-judgment royalty.”).
353
Id. at 1357 n.2 (quoting Order at 6–8, Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l., No.
03-CV-1431 SBA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44107, *16–20 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2007)
(quoting Freeman v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 661 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D. Del. 1987))).
354
Id. (emphasis added).
355
See Patent Reexamination Hearing, supra note 32, at 53:
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In Baxter,356 the Federal Circuit specifically anticipated criticism that it would be “erroneously elevating the decision by the PTO
over a decision by a federal district court, which decision has been
affirmed by this court . . . .”357 The court’s answer to such criticism
was that, “this case is not about the relative primacy of the courts
and the PTO, about which there can be no dispute” but, rather, it is
a consequence of the court’s inability to “conclude that the PTO
was barred from conducting the reexamination of the ᾽434 patent
because of the final judgment in Fresenius without overruling
Ethicon and Swanson . . . .”358
Ethicon v. Quigg, which had been decided in 1988, held that
reexamination proceedings were dictated, by statute, to be conducted with “special dispatch”359 and, therefore, could not be held
in abeyance pending determination of litigation concerning a
patent.360 The Federal Circuit in In re Swanson361 stated that courts
do not uphold patent validity in civil litigation, but, rather, determine
whether “a challenger who attacks the validity of patent claims . . .
[has] . . . overcome the presumption of validity with clear and
convincing evidence that the patent is invalid.”362 To put the
Swanson court’s point in different words, one might say that courts
Witness the report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System
in 1966. Within the boundaries defined by the Commission, the
Commission identified six objectives:
First: To raise the quality and reliability of the US patent.

***
Fourth: To reduce the expense of obtaining and litigating a patent.
356
In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
357
Id. at 1365.
358
Id.
359
Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1425–26 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“All reexamination
proceedings under this section, including any appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, will be conducted with special dispatch within the Office.”) (emphasis
added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 305) (1988)).
360
Id. at 1426. The Court stated:
The issue for us is whether “special dispatch” contemplates that a
reexamination be suspended pending the outcome of a district court
case involving allegations of invalidity of the same patent. We
conclude that it does not.
Id.
361
In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
362
Id. at 1377 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282).
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can properly decide whether, under the clear and convincing
evidence standard, a granted patent is not invalid. Because validity
is presumed, courts are not in fact tasked with deciding whether a
patent is valid in an affirmative sense.
For the Federal Circuit, therefore, while patent reexamination
will not be stayed pending the outcome of litigation concerning the
same patent, and the Patent Office, at any rate, is not bound by
determinations of validity made by a court, a court is not free to uphold the validity of a patent previously determined to be invalid in a
separate reexamination proceeding. Moreover, as stated in Ethicon,
“if a court finds a patent invalid, and that decision is either upheld
on appeal or not appealed, the PTO may discontinue its reexamination.”363 This, according to the court in Ethicon, is consistent
with Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University Illinois Foundation, which “held that where a patent has been declared invalid in
a proceeding in which the ‘patentee has had a full and fair chance to
litigate the validity of his patent,’ the patentee is collaterally
estopped from re-litigating the validity of the patent.”364 In other
words, while the patentee is collaterally estopped from re-litigating
the validity of the patent found invalid by the Patent Office during
reexamination or by another court, the Patent Office or another court
can strike down a patent as invalid, despite a previous decision by
either the Patent Office or an Article III Court to the contrary.
In effect, while the Patent Office and Article III courts are both
able to rule against the validity of a patent previously found valid or
not invalid, respectively, in separate proceedings, neither the Patent
Office nor Article III courts can uphold a patent in the face of a final
contrary decision. The requirement of “special dispatch” put upon
the Patent Office in reexamination proceedings365 may well not
“elevate a decision by the PTO over the federal circuit court.”
Nevertheless, this requirement does highlight that statutory postgrant examination proceedings made available to third parties gives
363

Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1429.
Id. (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333
(1971)).
365
35 U.S.C. § 305. Both inter partes review and post-grant review are required to come
to a “final determination” within one year of the institution of proceedings, with an
extension for “good cause” not to exceed six months. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11).
364
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rise to the problem of overlapping jurisdiction between the Patent
Office and the Article III courts—a problem that, indeed, the special
dispatch requirement exacerbates.
C. A Plea for Reconsideration of Post-Grant Patent Examination
Clearly, the odds are stacked against patentees, and the opportunities for gamesmanship are many. Both of these factors seem to
belie any original intent of the drafters of reexamination or any
third-party post-grant examination legislation purporting to protect
patentees from unrealistic expectations of the value of their patents,
or that they are being provided with a low-cost alternative to litigation that would assist them in making appropriate business decisions
about enforcement of their intellectual property.366
In her dissent, Judge Newman in Baxter stated that she
supported the “concept of reexamination as an efficient and economical alternative to litigation in appropriate cases.”367 Her
concern was with “the distortion of this purpose,” which, according
to Judge Newman, “was not intended to undermine the finality
of judicial process . . . [and thereby] “negate the repose provided
by adjudication.”368
The issues raised in Fresenius v. Baxter and In re Baxter are not
limited to reexamination, but extend to IPRs, PGRs, and CBMs, and
appear to be manifesting in these other proceedings as time goes
on.369 Perhaps support for post-grant examination as a whole should
366

See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 330.
In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting).
368
Id. Interestingly, though, Judge Newman also observed, like Professor Dolin, that the
“only patents that are reexamined, like the only patents that are litigated, are patents on
inventions that are of value.” Id. Dolin stated in his 2015 article, for example:
[A]lthough the post-issuance review proceedings (whether of the
pre- or post-AIA variety) have ostensibly been designed to eliminate
“the worst patents,” they are not the ones that end up as the focus of
these proceedings . . . . It is the patents that are economically valuable
that get the most attention . . . . The perverse result is that it is the
“best” rather than the “worst” patents that are subject to post-issuance
review.
Dolin, supra note 8, at 911–12 (citations omitted).
369
The potential for gamesmanship consequent to overlapping jurisdiction of post-grant
examination proceedings created by the AIA can be seen in recent cases, such as Versata
367
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be reconsidered; the goal of providing an “economic alternative to
litigation in appropriate cases” arguably has not been met by
proceedings that can be initiated by “members of the public.” To the
contrary, whatever certainty patentees believe is conferred by the
presumption of validity associated with a granted patent has been
seriously undercut by the alternative path of legislated third-partyinitiated post-issuance examination, whether it be by ex parte
reexamination, post-grant review, inter partes review, or covered
business method proceedings. The problems associated with these
alternatives to litigation stem largely from what is, in effect, overlapping jurisdiction between the executive and judicial branches
over patent validity that exacerbates uncertainty for patent holders,
particularly those trying to make business decisions on the basis of
granted patents.
The key to resolving the high level of uncertainty associated
with overlapping jurisdiction among government branches is to
remove that jurisdiction from one of those governing branches. In
this case, history provides a clear choice. Patents have been considered to be private property since the founding of this country370 and

Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., where the Federal Circuit affirmed the
finality of a damages award despite apparently reopening that judgment for modification,
and in the face of an intervening verdict of invalidity by the PTAB consequent to a CBM
proceeding. 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Opticurrent, LLC v. Power
Integrations, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94615 *1 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2019). In
Opticurrent, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion to enter a backdated judgment that
would nullify a reexamination proceeding initiated by the defendant based on evidence the
defendant deliberately withheld during an infringement trial. Separately, the Patent Office
has made precedential at least two IPRs, NHK Spring Co., Ltd. v. Intri-Plex Technologies,
Inc., No. IPR2018-00752 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018) and Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting
Products, Inc., Nos. IPR2019-00062, IPR2019-00063, IPR2019-00084 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2,
2019), and made informative two other cases, Becton Dickenson & Co. v. B. Braun
Melsungen AG, No. IPR2017-01586 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2017) and Kayak Software Corp.
v. IBM Corp., CBM2016-00075 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2016); setting forth and applying
factors that are intended to curb abuse of post-grant examination proceedings. However,
the proper channel for alleviation of those concerns is not reliance on self-restraint by the
Patent Office, but, rather, to remove the overlap of jurisdiction that is at the root of the
conflict enabling much abuse.
370
See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 25, at 700 (“Nineteenth century courts concluded that
patents were constitutional private property based on a logical development in both patent
and constitutional law.”).
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have a long history of regulatory oversight.371 While it is true that
the grant of an exclusionary right to a patentee for a limited period
of time embraces both private and public aspects in that the property
right is held privately against public interests, the patentee has
bargained for that exclusionary right by disclosing the patented
invention to the world. As a contract, such disclosure constitutes
consideration that, unlike working a plot of land or practicing an
invention, cannot be returned or extinguished. Therefore, the consideration of disclosure put up by patentees in exchange for a limited
period of exclusivity should be honored by the Patent Office upon
grant of exclusionary rights. Mistake on the part of the Patent Office,
or even fraud on the part of patentees, will, of course, negate the
value of that consideration, but these are fair game as defenses to
infringement or in declaratory judgment actions before an Article III
court. Post-grant examination by the Patent Office should be limited
to fact finding as an adjunct to litigation before district courts, subject to a substantial evidence standard that would allow the Patent
Office to apply its technical expertise to matters of fact.372 Failure
to so limit post-grant examination proceedings will perpetuate the
erosion of confidence currently underway in American patent law.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Stern provided a narrow path for adjudication under Article I by expressly refraining from “any view on
how the doctrine [of public rights exception] might apply in [a]
different context [than that of a state law counterclaim].”373 However, despite potentially relevant Supreme Court decisions and dicta
in Thomas and Granfinanciera, the better view under the weight of
371

See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (2012) (“[T]he first
regulatory agency established outside of any executive department at the national level was
not the ICC [Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1887]; it was the Patent Office, created
ninety-seven years earlier.”).
372
See supra text accompanying note 261. For a discussion of the development and
role of the substantial evidence standard during expansion of administrative law in the
early twentieth century, see generally DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014).
373
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494 (2011); see also supra text accompanying note
221.
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Supreme Court precedent with respect to patent validity (but for the
recent decision by the Court in Oil States), is that determination of
the validity of issued patents does not include the government as a
party and, therefore, only private rights are involved.
To conceptualize patents within the narrow framework of “franchises” is profoundly misleading, because from such a perspective
their fate would seem to become merely a function of privileges to
be maintained at the discretion of a sovereign. Rather, a patent
historically has been, and should continue to be, conceived of as a
contract governing a property transaction between the government
and the patentee. This contract has two key features: the patentee
holds private rights conferred by the government in consideration of
the patentee’s disclosure; and the contract is cancellable only pursuant to review by an independent and neutral branch of government.
Jurisdiction over the validity of granted patents should, therefore, be solely under Article III. Statutory provisions for post grant
examination at the Patent Office should be limited to an advisory
capacity as an adjunct to a federal district court and address only
issues of fact. Such factual determinations coming from the Patent
Office should be subject to review for substantial evidence by a
district court in order to pass constitutional muster.

